Forum draws on three papers presented at this conference, complemented by a fourth paper by David Ellison, in order to present the major issues associated with the enlargement and transformation of the European Union and the expansion and evolving role of NATO.

The first piece in the Forum, written by Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly, examines the ability of the European Union to assimilate new members over time and the extent to which EU structures and norms have replicated themselves within new member states. These authors use cluster analysis to determine whether the increased diversity of new members significantly undermines the integrative project. The second piece by David Ellison emphasizes state interests over community values as the impetus behind the expansion of EU membership. His essay draws attention to the benefits of EU enlargement to old member states and the costs and burdens for new member states. Ellison argues that the determination by existing members to preserve and safeguard their own interests, the asymmetrical bargaining power of old and new member states, and the risk of being excluded from the 2004 wave of enlargement led to enormous concessions by East European negotiators during the accession process.

The third and fourth pieces address the evolving security environment in Europe as NATO expands to incorporate postcommunist European states. Zoltan Barany examines the past two rounds of NATO enlargement, detailing the evolving debates supporting and opposing expansion that occurred within NATO and the United States. In his essay, Barany discusses the impact of the World Trade Center bombings on the unexpectedly rapid expansion of NATO and reflects upon the prospects for further additions to NATO’s membership. The fourth piece by Wade Jacoby explores the implications of NATO’s expansion for the security of the new NATO members as they channel military spending away from providing for their own domestic security in favor of creating elite forces that can participate in NATO actions on a symbolic, if not superficial, level. Jacoby explains that the United States government became more interested in this symbolic support after September 11, 2001 and less concerned with military modernization and overall military contributions from new NATO members given its own needs in the war in Iraq.

Together these four essays offer important insights into the changing architecture of European politics and security. They should stimulate future research on European institutions in the new millennium.

As Europe Gets Larger, Will It Disappear?

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AND

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Political theorists from Plato and Aristotle to Machiavelli and Montesquieu have frequently commented on the connection between the size of a political community and its coherence. The dominant strand of thought in Western political theory suggests the importance of restricting the size of a political unit. Small political units more readily maintain solidarity and find common interests among members than larger ones. Large political units, by contrast, have trouble sustaining the affections of the citizenry and quickly become administratively unwieldy. It is important to note, however, that not all classical theorists share the same pessimism about large communities. The founders of the US republic believed, for a number of reasons,
that only a territorially large and diverse United States would be viable. Madison’s argument in Federalist 10, that only a large United States would succeed in balancing sectional interests off against each other, is the best known but certainly not the only version of the “size increases coherence” strain of US liberal and republican thought.

The enlargement of the European Union provides us with yet another opportunity to think through this age-old question. Although increasing the membership of the community may bring the dream of a united Europe one step closer, there are dangers. The issue in this case is fairly straightforward. Will the growing heterogeneity of the European Union’s constituent units render it so diverse that it will no longer make sense to speak of a Union at all? Even if we think about the matter in less apocalyptic terms, we may still ask if there is a tradeoff between the “widening” of the European Union and the “deepening” of the integrative project. Or, put in the terms of current debates, does enlargement threaten Europeanization?

After the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in spring of 2005, analysts maintained that part of what drove the “no” vote was precisely the suspicion that the European Union had grown too large too fast.

In what follows, we argue that, based on one cut at the empirical data, enlargement does not threaten Europeanization. In fact, if one views the matter in terms of how the European Union’s political economy has unfolded over time, widening seems to go hand in hand with deepening. Why this is so can only be speculated upon at this point, however, and the genuine purpose of the current exercise is to develop a way of assessing the relationship between enlargement and integration. Thus, we will begin by discussing two models for assessing this relationship that are found in both survey research and the literature on Europeanization. Although both of these models have much to offer in their analysis of enlargement and integration, we settle on a third model, comparative cluster analysis of political economies, one that we contend is more appropriate for exploring the relationship between widening and deepening in the case of the European Union. Our results suggest that the European Union has a formidable capacity to assimilate new members over time and that this capacity is probably growing as a result of the Union’s increasing overall capacity to monitor both its own and its new members. This last point must remain speculative, but it is consistent with the broader quantitative findings.

The Relationship between Widening and Deepening: How to Proceed?
The literature on the European Union contains two important clues as to how one should proceed in understanding the relationship between widening and deepening. The first comes from a venerable tradition in survey research that is designed to compare the underlying values of European citizens. The Eurobarometer, World Values Survey, and a broad range of other national and international surveys provide us with valuable information. Because these surveys ask similar questions across time in all EU member countries (and most candidate countries), they offer us one easy way of assessing just how cohesive the European Union is as a unit over time. Using the results of the World Values Survey, for example, one would be hard pressed to be optimistic about the future coherence of an enlarged European Union. In addition to the already present West European divide between traditionalist and cosmopolitan orientations, an even deeper divide between the postmaterialist West and the pre–postmaterialist East suggests that after enlargement Europeans will have even less in common than ever before.

Such an analysis is sobering, and it should not be underplayed. In terms of important kinds of values, we cannot argue that an enlarged Europe will be a more coherent one. This line of thought can be considered the empirical version of the classical republicans’ worry about large political units. As important as this line of
analysis might be, however, it misses something important about the European Union and imputes to this institution a function that it has never taken on. For apart from the requirement that members share a common commitment to democracy and human rights, the European Union from its inception has never adopted cultural homogenization as one of its central goals. On the contrary, what makes the European Union so appealing for new members is precisely the fact that member societies can retain that which makes them different culturally. What binds the European Union together is not its values. After all, what do the Dutch and the Italians of the Europe of six share that is any more compelling than what the Estonians and Portuguese will share in the Europe of 25? What binds the European Union together, as theorists of European integration across paradigmatic divides agree, is economic interdependence that successive treaties have sought to intensify and institutionalize.

The real question about coherence, therefore, should not be about the impact of diversity on values but the impact of diversity on the creation of a common European model of political economy. Yet, even if there is a European model—or several submodels—of political economy, will not the addition of so many new members threaten the capacity of Brussels to enforce the kinds of regulations it needs to sustain and intensify economic interdependence? If this becomes the question, a second literature that arose directly out of the study of the European Union recommends itself, namely the large literature on “Europeanization” (for an overview, see Johan Olsen 2002). Although this literature is sometimes unclear in its use of the term Europeanization, what is basically meant here is the capacity of Brussels to affect both national legislation and policy implementation. To the extent that there is an imbalance between a country’s national policies and what is “required” at the EU level, there should be an observable “Europeanization” effect that the student of the European Union can document. When done well, this literature is quite convincing and offers a new way to think about the European Union. A number of important studies have been done documenting Europeanization (and resistance to Europeanization) in important policy areas (see Börzel 2003).

Does this literature offer us a route to assess the relationship between enlargement and integration? In some ways it does. In fact, this kind of research has been the primary mode of analysis of the candidate members over time by the Commission itself. Most work on enlargement has focused on the monitoring functions of the commission and the reactions of candidate countries to the periodic reports that are designed to ensure the passing and implementation of the aquis. Yet, despite the important contributions of this kind of work, the research program that follows from it would be daunting and, in some respects perhaps, unfeasible. Such a program would require a comprehensive qualitative analysis of many policy areas of old and new member states over time in order to assess the Europeanizing effect. Even when completed, though, we would still be left with the thorny issue of intercoder reliability: how can we be sure that two different scholars’ assessments of Europeanization are based on the same standards? Furthermore, if what we are looking for is some systematic measure of the capacity of Brussels to inspire or enforce a model (or perhaps two or three models) of European political economy, it is unclear how case studies of Europeanization will get us there.

**Cluster Analysis**

An alternative to using policy inputs and outputs in specific cases involves examining all of the political economies in Europe in order to assess whether it makes sense to speak of European models of political economy and whether enlargement over time has changed the picture. We take as our point of departure Steve Chan’s (2001) comparative study of Asian, Latin American, and North American economic
Chan’s work is essentially a quantitative test of Fajnzylber’s qualitatively derived assertion that the United States and Japan serve as exemplars for their respective neighbors. Chan develops what he terms a “numerical taxonomy” of the larger political economies of the Asia-Pacific and the Americas using cluster analysis. The purpose of cluster analysis is “to group similar items in a common category while separating dissimilar items in different categories” (Chan 2001:1142). It has been used extensively in the biological and social sciences to classify and categorize, especially when these tasks are central to testing and confirming hypotheses. Chan uses a range of economic, educational, and social indicators in a cluster analysis to examine whether there is, in fact, an emulative effect at work—that is, whether it makes sense to speak of a US or a Japanese model in the two regions. He ultimately rejects the assertion. The political economies of the Americas and Asia do not cluster in patterns that Fajnzylber’s qualitative analysis would predict.

What works for Asia and the Americas may also be useful for thinking about Europe. That is, cluster analysis can also be used to assess the political economies of Europe. The question that we need to address is whether over time, as Europe has grown larger, the new states cluster with the older ones or reside in groups by themselves. If there is such a thing as Europeanization, Europe’s political economies, including the political economies of the most recent member states, should start to “look like” each other. Scholars have argued that one of the European Union’s most powerful foreign policy tools—perhaps its only powerful foreign policy tool—is its ability to use the prospect of membership, combined with conditionality, to export its model of economic governance. Does this, in fact, occur? Does it make sense to speak of a European model (or models) that EU membership and candidate membership favors and sustains? Alternatively, is membership in the European Union relatively unimportant for determining a country’s political economy compared with, say, level of economic development or inclusion in the broader international division of labor? These are the questions that we now address.

There are a number of different cluster analysis techniques that share the basic objective of classifying units. Although the objective may be the same, the techniques—for example, whether the starting point is separating out the most different cases or identifying the most similar cases—have consequences for what the clusters ultimately look like. Accordingly, if the emphasis is on identifying the outlier cases first, the clusters will reflect the most extreme behaviors of the units. If the approach seeks to identify the central tendency of the data, the clusters represent a spectrum of the units from those that appear “most normal” to those with “abnormal” tendencies.

Our approach, in contrast, is to identify the groupings where units within display commonalities and where there is little divergence in behavior. Clusters are “built” in stages. In the first stage, each state is its own cluster. In the second round, the two states that display the least variation across all variables are grouped together. In each subsequent round, a state or cluster is added to another cluster until all states are in a single cluster. This technique, termed the Ward’s method of hierarchical clustering, minimizes the variance within clusters. This approach is also known as the within-groups sum of squares or the error sum of squares, and has been a popular method in the social sciences (Aldendorfer and Blashfield 1984). For our purposes, this technique makes sense as a means of identifying where groups of states exhibit common behavioral patterns.

By tracking the stages, it is possible to identify where the logical “breaking points” are between groups of states. At each stage in the analysis, when a cluster is joined to another, the difference or variance between the two joined cases is calculated and represented on an agglomeration schedule as a coefficient. The $R^2$ term is also calculated for each stage. In the initial stage, all of the variance across units is explained by the fact that the units are independent (or unclustered), so the $R^2$ score is a perfect 1.0. As clustering occurs in each stage, part of the variance within clusters is unexplained, and the $R^2$ decreases. The amount that the $R^2$
decreases from stage to stage indicates how well the joining clusters fit together. So, by tracking the changes by stage, it is possible to identify similar and dissimilar clusters and what the logical number of clusters is.

Which variables should we include in our analysis? Asking this question is basically the same as asking what kinds of variables are used to determine the basic nature of a political economy. The problem is that students of political economy do not agree on the answer to this basic query. Some economists argue that the important variables are level of government control and government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Others maintain that we should focus on GDP/per capita or percentage of GDP generated from agriculture or industry. Others distinguish between import- and export-oriented economies. Yet another group of scholars concentrates on educational levels of the population and human capital. The list goes on. We suggest that even though, for purposes of parsimony, it may make sense to pick one variable, for purposes of empirical accuracy, when comparing political economies, we believe it important not to place too much weight on any one variable. In other words, for this kind of exercise, what one wants is a highly articulated, “kitchen sink” model in which a large range of variables is included in the analysis. In this way, no one variable can either make or break the analysis, and countries will cluster according to their overall socioeconomics and production profiles.

With this discussion in mind, we included in our analysis a set of variables that captured a breadth of issue areas. They fall loosely into three categories: variables that represent the country’s economic philosophy regarding trade and domestic development, variables that represent efforts to build human capital through investment, and variables that represent economic performance and resource development in noneconomic sectors. The particular variables we explored are listed in Table 1.1. Data were gathered from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data set with the exception of the gini coefficients, which come from Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire (1996) and the OECD. Most of these measures were

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<th>Human Capital</th>
<th>Performance and Noneconomic Sectors</th>
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<td>Export of goods and services (% of GDP)</td>
<td>Educational expenditures (public spending, % of GDP)</td>
<td>Annual growth rate of GNP</td>
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<td>Trade (% of GDP)</td>
<td>% of student age group enrolled in tertiary education</td>
<td>Population growth</td>
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<td>Genuine domestic savings (% of GDP)</td>
<td>% of student age group enrolled in secondary education</td>
<td>Military expenditures (% of GDP)</td>
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<td>Gross domestic investment (% of GDP)</td>
<td>High-tech sector exports (% of manufacturing exports)</td>
<td>Gini coefficient score (distribution of wealth)</td>
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<td>Manufactured products (% of total exports)</td>
<td>Number of scientists and engineers per million</td>
<td>% of total imports accounted for by food items</td>
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<td>Importance of foreign capital (FDI as % of GDI)</td>
<td>[Number of passenger cars per 1,000 people]</td>
<td>Percent of labor force employed in the agricultural sector</td>
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<td>Private consumption (% of GDP)</td>
<td>General government consumption (% of GDP)</td>
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Table 1.1. Variables Included in Analysis by Issue Area
included in the Chan–Fajnzylber model that addresses economic ideology. We have excluded from our analysis their measures of social capital and social integration, interpersonal violence, influence of state-owned enterprise, and level of debt burden either because the measures were unavailable for some countries during the timeframe under analysis or because the transition from a communist to capitalist economic system made such comparisons too crude to be meaningful. We include measures of genuine domestic savings, military expenditures, population growth, private consumption, educational expenditures, and trade to capture a broader range of issue areas than Chan and Fajnzylber address.

The first two groups of variables encompass important ways that analysts usually differentiate economies. Broadly speaking, the economic philosophy variables reflect different kinds of economic policies on consumption, investment, the promotion of foreign trade, and the role of the state in the economy. The human capital variables reflect different levels of investment that governments can make in education, technology, and applied scientific research.

Included in the second category of Human Capital is the variable of “Passenger Cars per 1000 People.” Although the number of passenger cars is more reflective of social interaction or private consumption than human capital, empirically it falls into this category. This measure is used in both the Chan and Fajnzylber studies. Ownership of private vehicles is, according to Fajnzylber, an indicator of excessive consumption and of US-style individuality. Because our study is attempting to determine whether there is an evolving EU style of political economy distinct from the more general pattern of modernization or globalization processes, we include this variable in our model as well.

The third set of variables is less focused than the previous two. It reflects important differences in policies that result from variation in social and economic outcomes that often reflect deep differences in policy. “Annual Growth Rate of GNP” serves as a proxy for development cycles that are synchronized between states and the extent to which the countries are engaged in similar economic sectors or in the same markets. “Population Growth” reflects cultural norms and policies that manage reproduction. The “Military Expenditures” variable may be of a different character than most of the variables, but it is an important indicator of whether a strategic culture—and in particular a convergence of philosophy on spending for defense—is developing. The notions of shared military burdens and balancing power are important for evolving security communities and common security interests. The gini coefficients are intended to identify whether states have diverse distributions of wealth, which could stem from varying levels of modernization or disparate attitudes about social welfare and the role of the state in society. The variables of “Imported Food Items” and “Labor Force in the Agricultural Sector” are intended to capture the extent of specialization in the workforces.

A further question is which countries should be included in the analysis? It is obviously important to choose a large sample of “old” EU member states if one is going to try to gauge an EU effect. We have, therefore, included data from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. Note that we have included countries that are relatively new members, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In addition, we have included countries that joined in May 2004 in order to assess the impact of EU conditionality. We have also included a small number of European countries that will not be members of the EU in the short term as a control group. Finally, we included Japan, Canada, and the United States in order to control for the rival hypothesis: the real possibility that models of political economy are being driven primarily by international economic pressures and not by pressures generated from Brussels. If EU countries fall into the same
cluster as either of these three, this suggests the possibility that the term Europeanization may simply be the European word for “globalization.”

A final question is the timeframe. Given that we are trying to assess the impact of enlargement on European integration over time, it seems important to conduct the analysis at different time intervals. Given limitations on data availability and given that we are dealing with a number of postcommunist states whose precommunist data is not really comparable, we have chosen to analyze 3 years: 1986, 1992, and 1998. These years make intuitive sense. The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC in 1986 make that year a logical baseline. The collapse of communism in 1989 makes 1992 a good baseline year for assessing the profile of the postcommunist cases. The year 1998 represents the last year for which we were able to locate relatively complete data for all countries. Taken together these 3 years provide important snapshots of the political economies of a large range of countries during an important period in Europe’s history of integration.

Results

With Ward’s method of hierarchical clustering, a number of statistics are generated that can assist in identifying the logical groupings of states. The agglomeration schedule is useful for determining how many clusters should be identified. A decrease in the $R^2$ indicates that two “different” clusters have been combined. Another way of understanding the extent to which countries share similar characteristics is to observe the proximity matrix. Each country’s score for all variables is computed and compared with other countries. The extent of the variance between countries is computed into a “dissimilarity score.” From this, we can identify which countries are most alike and which most different.

The agglomeration schedule, proximity matrix, and dendrogram (illustrating how states cluster with each other) for 1986 are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix to this Forum (following the references).

Although there is no gold standard within cluster analysis to tell us exactly where the necessary “break point” is, we have chosen in this case to take the logical break point as five clusters because the agglomeration from six to five clusters results in a decrease in the $R^2$ of 0.07, whereas moving from five to four clusters results in a decrease of 0.09. With five clusters, the breakdown of countries is reported in Table 1.2.

With few exceptions, these clusters represent a fairly intuitive picture of what we would consider the political economies of the world to be. Cluster one represents a “European,” “Rhenish,” or “Corporatist” model with the possible exception of Ireland. Cluster two suits our conventional picture of the United States and Canada as pluralist political economies. Cluster three is more difficult to interpret. Spain,

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Portugal, and Greece, as new EU members, would be expected to be in a category of their own, but Britain and France are more difficult to explain. France’s unusually strong reliance on agriculture and Great Britain’s outlier status within the EU more generally may account for this grouping. Japan, not surprisingly for 1986, still constitutes its own category, as does Turkey.

One way to think about the groups is to consider the values of the variables that make each category distinct. Which variables are driving the categorization? Using an analysis of the standard deviations from the mean, cluster one represents the mean. Cluster two with the United States and Canada is driven by lower than average food imports and domestic savings and by higher than average enrollment in tertiary education as well as population growth. Japan is placed in its own cluster because of a higher than average percentage of manufactured products in its exports, gross domestic investment and savings, and percentage of scientists, and a lower than average military spending. Turkey lands in its own cluster primarily because of its much higher than average level of social inequality as measured by the gini coefficient.

Table 1.3 shows the clusters that were found for 1992, which includes a number of new accession countries as well as two expected accession countries (Romania and Bulgaria) from the former communist world. The agglomeration schedule, proximity matrix, and dendrogram for 1992 are available in Table A.2 of the Appendix. Once again, we have chosen to take five clusters as the logical cutoff point with the results being as follows.

These clusters give us a good sense of the starting point for the new European capitalist economies in 1992. Spain, Portugal, and Greece—the 1981/1986 enlargement—merge into the same cluster as Poland and Hungary, either suggesting that these latter two countries were indeed the most fit to join the EU or that they benefitted from early assistance after 1989 under the auspices of the PHARE program. At the same time, it is important to note that at this level of agglomeration, neither group joins up with either cluster one or cluster three, which represent the main EU clusters.

It is also worth noting at this point that Japan, Canada, and the United States join European clusters (albeit barely). The latter two, however, are part of a different cluster than Japan. This is partially the result of the larger comparison group. At this level of agglomeration, the United States and Canada look much more like Denmark, France, and Great Britain than like Bulgaria or Spain. But it may also represent the beginnings of a “globalization effect” that will have to be revisited in the 1998 clusters.

The clusters in 1992 are driven primarily by the following variables. The countries in cluster one exhibited a higher than average level of savings. Cluster two countries in 1992 were more trade dependent than is typically thought to be the case. They were also experiencing significantly below average economic growth.
(at the height of the postcommunist recessions) and, as demographers of the immediate postcommunist era have pointed out repeatedly, below average population growth. What distinguishes cluster three countries from cluster one is primarily their higher than average percentage of university age population. Cluster four countries, which include both the 1981/1986 accession states plus the front runners in the early postcommunist phase (Hungary and Poland) were characterized at this time by higher than average private consumption and lower than average levels of investment in scientific training. Once again, Turkey lands in its own category, driven primarily by its outlier status on many variables, but especially by its high level of inequality as measured by its gini coefficient, which is more than three standard deviations above the mean.

Table 1.4 shows the clusters that resulted for 1998. The agglomeration schedule, proximity matrix, and dendrogram for 1998 are reported in Table A.3 of the Appendix. Once again, we used five clusters as the logical break point.

These results are interesting. In contrast with 1992, Spain and Portugal have now joined one of the two main “European” clusters. In addition, Poland has joined as well. The other accession countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia—remain in their own cluster. Greece, always the Sorgekind of Brussels, is now grouped with Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey in a Balkan cluster. At the same time, Japan and the United States also join the main European cluster with Canada joining the Scandinavian countries.

The categorizations in 1998 are driven by cluster one being close to the mean on all variables. Belgium, Ireland, and the Netherlands in cluster two are above the mean for export of goods and services, savings, trade, and high tech exports. Cluster three, which includes not only Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey but also Greece, is constituted by its members’ higher than average inequality, military spending, and private consumption (but lower than average possession of passenger cars), and lower than average investments in human capital as measured by educational expenditures and relative numbers of scientists in the general population. Cluster four, the Scandinavian countries plus Canada, comes together around higher than average government consumption, lower than average private consumption, and higher than average investment in human capital. Finally, cluster five, which consists of four postcommunist countries that are usually considered the more advanced ones, takes shape around their common export dependence and lower than average investment in human capital.

It is important for the reader to note that the clusters for the three years studied here do not replicate a simple modernization theoretic model as would be indicated, for example, by the cluster breakdown for 1992 based on GNP/per capita reported in Table 1.5.
Conclusion

What do the data suggest? Regarding the main question addressed in this essay, there is some ground for optimism. If one accepts our model of the European Union as essentially about the integration of political economies, then over time there appears to be an important “EU effect” on new and candidate members. Independent of modernization, as measured by GNP per capita, both Spain and Portugal from the earlier round of accession, and Poland in the current round, now have political economies that are not too dissimilar from the other dominant political economies in Europe. At the same time, despite a decade of serious effort, by 1998 a large group of postcommunist countries still displayed essential political economic traits that lead us to classify their political economies as qualitatively different from the main European groups. Furthermore, EU membership alone, as the case of Greece warns us, is not enough to ensure the diffusion of an EU economic model, even broadly conceived, to new members.

At the same time, it is important to note the limitations of any analysis pointing to an “EU effect” in these data. The United States, Canada, and Japan were included in our analysis with the explicit intention of controlling for a plausible rival hypothesis to Europeanization, namely the general convergence of the political economies of all advanced industrial countries with each other. In fact, these cluster analyses support such an interpretation. As others have argued, it is not easy to separate EU effects from globalization effects. In their important analysis of Europeanization versus globalization, Daniel Verdier and R. Breen (2001) suggest that both effects are at work, but, at the level of the political economy, globalization may be just as strong as Europeanization, depending on what is being analyzed; or, in the case of Europe at least, globalization and Europeanization are two ways of saying basically the same thing.

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Let us assume for a moment, however, that there is an important European effect acting upon the new member states. Such an assumption is not unfounded given the overwhelming proportion of trade and investment between the accession countries and the older members of the European Union, even if these effects are no longer easily distinguishable from “globalization.” The rapid integration of Spain, Portugal, and Poland into the main EU cluster suggests that widening the European Union does not necessarily stand at odds with deepening. In fact, the power of the European Union to Europeanize its members and assimilate new ones may have even increased at precisely the moment when the body was growing larger.

Why this is the case may be worth some speculation. One way of thinking about this issue is simply to note that the deepening of the European Union after 1986 has allowed the organization to assimilate new members more effectively because the interdependence implied by membership intensified significantly between 1986 and 1998. The huge expansion of the aquis itself between these two dates provides indirect evidence for this assertion. In short, the European Union has become

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Table 1.5. 1992 Cluster Breakdown Based on GNP Per Adult Only
much better at exporting its model of economic governance. Others have noted that enlargement has become the European Union’s most effective foreign policy instrument. This empirical analysis supports such an argument.

A second way of thinking about the paradox of widening and deepening occurring at the same time is to think about the impact of deepening on the Commission. Although the European Commission is a much criticized body and its powers much debated by students of the European Union, an argument can be made that the Commission’s powers of monitoring old members have increased. That is, over the past 20 years the Commission has learned how to monitor new and candidate members who were at widely varying levels of preparedness. It is probably true then that the capacity of the Commission to monitor and enforce integration has not been hindered by enlargement but has been increased by enlargement. The dynamics of this learning process—one that occurred hand in hand with widening and somehow filtered back into the capacity of the European Union for integration (deepening)—is something that remains dimly understood by EU specialists.

Divide and Conquer:
The European Union Enlargement’s Successful Conclusion?¹

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What drives enlargement of the European Union is a topic of great debate and is comparatively undertheorized. This fact is surprising given the degree of long-term membership growth in the European Union. Begun in 1957 as a geographically tight-knit group of six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), the European Union has now progressively expanded to a group of 25 countries and will likely reach 27 member states in 2007. Turkey and Croatia began negotiating membership in 2005 and Macedonia was granted candidate status at the 2005 December Summit. Further potential applicants are standing in the wings. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Albania, and some of the remaining Russian satellite states (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) will likely pursue future membership bids.

A close examination of the final terms of the EU membership agreement involving Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and the bargaining process by which it was decided, helps illustrate the typically intergovernmental character of the accession process. Some scholars (see, in particular, Fierke and Wiener 1999; Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 2001) have suggested that enlargement and the decision of Western states to accept the Central and East European countries has been effectively driven by the constraints of collective identity and social norms, that is, by a sense of “community values.” By contrast, this essay will argue that a more traditional intergovernmental model is better suited to explaining the enlargement

¹This essay is a shortened version of a longer working paper (Ellison 2005b). Readers interested in more detail should consult this working paper. Previous versions of this essay were presented at the 2004 Midwest Political Science Association meeting and the 2004 meeting of the American Political Science Association. The author is indebted to the Institute for World Economics (IWE) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for research assistance and an office on several occasions. Thanks are also due Bill Ferguson, Dora Husz, Wayne Moyer, Jack Mutti, Miklos Somai, Milada Anna Vachudova, and participants at the above conferences for helpful comments as well as Grinnell College for funding summer research in Hungary and Lukas Vrba for research assistance.