The concern with identity intersects with narrative. Narrative is far from simple although it is popularly understood in simple form. In linear essence, it focuses on stories—characters undertaking actions and interactions structured in plots (Miller 1990). To some, such stories may seem trivial or juvenile, developmentally restricted or disabled, but this impression is deeply misleading. Indeed, narrative is a fundamental way in which we define our understanding of reality and ourselves. It helps us bring closure—even though artificial, arbitrary, and temporary—to the infinite indeterminacy of our worlds and ourselves (cf. Roe 1994; Schleifer, Davis, and Mergler 1992). The seriousness of the narrative enterprise is illustrated, for example, in the work of Mircea Eliade and Claude Lévi-Strauss. For such authors, stories of everyday life and religious myths embody and maintain the structure of society. For distinguished historian William McNeill, narrative is at the center of the historian’s craft, and the dominant narratives become “myth histories” for their societies (cf. Mall 1992; Barthes 1972). For psychologist Jerome Bruner (1990, 84, 77), the narrator is “a form of Self,” and “the ‘push’ to construct narrative” provides an “entry into meaning.” In the work of computer scientist Roger Schank (1990), stories structure computational models of human cognition; frames and scripts are major building blocks of artificial intelligence. More to the present point, Paul Ricoeur (1988, 247) states that “individual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history.” Self is thus embedded in narrative, which is the matrix that identifies, locates, indexes, specifies, and recognizes the emergent pattern of the Self (cf. Digeiser 1995; Kerby 1991; Edel 1984; Spence 1982).

These concerns with identity and narrative inform our discussion of Europe. We argue that European identity emerges from historical narrative. The Cold War is a special kind of narrative, a hegemonic narrative, or myth, whose authority was embedded in that of the dominant Cold War regime. The end of the Cold War has lessened the narrative’s appeal, increasingly opening it to revisionist interpretations and releasing previously suppressed competitors. Other stories now contend in a more pluralistic, multivoce European environment. The winner, if there is one, of this contest will be the future of Europe.

**Historical Europe and Cold War Europe**

Historians—political, economic, social, and cultural—positioned at different expanses of space and time with different visions, have constructed the identity and narrative of “Historical Europe.” They have embedded its long anchor in sedimented depths of oriental and occidental tradition, Judaic and
Islamic experience, the classical heritage of classical Greece and Rome, medieval Christian and feudal orders, the humanism of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the growth of nation-states, colonialism and imperialism, and democracy and capitalism. Wherever Europe is spoken, monasteries, archives, and libraries thickly describe the tapestries of Historical Europe for contemporary heirs waiting to claim their legacy. Europe's identity is lodged in these multiple stories, emerging from the past, but maintained in the present. Historical Europe is the collective name of all of these European stories.

One story from this group, placing Europe in the great frame of world politics, is of particular recent importance. The century of total war, in the telling phrase of Raymond Aron, nurtured the myth of the Cold War and Cold War Europe. Cold War Europe, in turn, constituted itself through a particular view of the world and itself. We formulate its central elements as follows:

The Cold War was a struggle between ultimate evil, represented by the Soviet Union, and the forces of good, represented by Europe and its allies.

The Atlantic Alliance between Europe and North America provided a wider umbrella of association and security.

Europe had a center, defined geographically by northwestern Europe and functionally by economics. Europe also had a periphery that blended into Central and Eastern Europe.

This narrative, reinforced by events, has been the hegemonic discourse, the dominant and interpretation, the mythical superframe of European politics for the last half century.

THE COLD WAR AND THE COMMunist ENEMY

Common knowledge and common sense of the Cold War constructed the world as a story of the Manichaean struggle between good and evil. Archetypal memory and millennia of historical enmity reinforced powerful distinctions between two hostile groups: a white, Christian, occidental Self, and a dark, oriental Other.

A system of concentric circles defined the essential Other, the Enemy. At the periphery of the outer ring, were the neutral nations even though, in the stark world of John Foster Dulles, there were no neutrals. In the next ring came the opposing Communist nations formally tied together through formal and informal political, military, economic, or cultural bonds, for example the Warsaw Pact; Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON); and agreements for military assistance, trade, and aid. Near the center of this Russian doll was the Soviet Union, and, successively, the Communist Party, the Kremlin, the Politburo, Joseph Stalin, and his successors.

This narrative was strongest and most persuasive during the early years of the Cold War. The Sino-Soviet split, combined with other differences in the camp of Communist nations; the death of Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev's renunciation of part of his legacy; the stresses and strains of peaceful coexistence—all of these gradually weakened the definition and credibility of the Enemy. As the half century of what John Lewis Gaddis called "the long peace" waned, Westerners had less and less reason to believe, based on their personal lives, that the fundamental choice was between being Red or dead. Yet, anchored in the primacy of earlier formative experience, the Cold War and the Communist Enemy continued to frame and orient Europe's post-World War II identity.

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRATIC ALLIES

Cold War history already fills whole libraries with sources and details. We can here only sketch out the key elements of the standard account. The story begins with the Allied victory over the Axis powers, a combination of triumph and tragedy. The Allied achievement led, paradoxically, to the disintegration of the grand alliance that had successfully prosecuted World War II. Allied agreements at Yalta dividing Europe into Eastern and Western spheres of influence; tensions at Potsdam, particularly surrounding the political implications of the first atomic bombs; and Allied conflicts over the administration of Berlin all prefigured what was to come.

Central to the account were the ruthless suppression of democratic institutions and dissent and the construction of Communist national regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly highlighted by the Czechoslovakian coup. These, combined with the terrible winter of 1946–47, encouraged Western fears of Soviet penetration and violation. Historical memories of invasion and conquest—the Moors in Spain, the Turks at the gates of Vienna—were an element of the deep background of Western response.

One of the foundational texts was George Kennan's 1946 "Long Telegram," the essence of which was published in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "Mr. X" and was the basis for National Security Council document NSC 68, which defined American strategic doctrine (see May 1993; Jensen 1991). These writings developed the ideas that came to be associated with the metaphor of
containment. Containment constructed an updated and protracted version of the siege script, which had figured so prominently in European military history, against walled castles and cities both in Europe itself and the Middle East. Containment promised to reduce the costs of resistance. The postwar allies had little stomach for a conventional war against masses of Soviet ground troops in Europe. During the war, the unwillingness of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme allied commander to allow Gen. George Patton to push forward against the Russians to the east reflected Allied military concerns. Moreover, memories of losses from two world wars that had begun from the “cult of the offensive” warned both the Soviet Union away from adventurism and the Allies away from military engagement that was not absolutely necessary (Snyder 1989).

The balance of terror was an important metaphor. Balance of terror took a standard stratagem of European historical diplomacy, balance of power, and added to it. Nuclear weapons supplemented the conventional historical arsenal. An important psychological dimension was also mixed in. Just as fire had produced panic in crowded medieval fortresses, atomic bombs served to induce terror in the Enemy. Indeed, they were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for their “shock” effect on both the Japanese and the Soviets (cf. Bundy 1988, 80; Alperovitz 1985).

Western leaders also had the task of alleviating the terror of their own populations and encouraging their will to resist the Enemy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) thus entered the narrative as the house in which allied nuclear weapons would be kept. Within NATO, the United States, together with Britain and France, provided the nuclear umbrella against potential Soviet nuclear weapons. Under the strategic doctrine—a genre of military narrative—of the sword and the shield, the institutions of NATO grouped and coordinated Western military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional forces and other related activities (see Beer 1969).

The developing story of the postwar order, and the pressures it implied, thus included the Atlantic Community as a protective habitat for European integration. The interior of the Atlantic Community comprehended not only military elements, but also economic and political dimensions. In the early stages of Atlantic economic cooperation, the Truman Doctrine and Point Four program aimed specifically at assisting Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan at the reconstruction of Western Europe. Formal economic institutions subsequently fleshed out the design. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), later the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), led to the creation of its Enemy double, COMECON. The NATO Parliamentarians Conference never attained the flowering of the advocates of full Atlantic union. Nevertheless, it contributed to the institutional superstructure of Atlantic Community. Atlantic institutions, including United States political, military, and economic power fit together with and buttressed Europe.

EUROPE: BOUNDARIES, CENTERS, AND PERIPHERIES

The Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall bounded Europe to the east. Winston Churchill, in his defining speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946, described the eastern perimeter of Europe: “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent” (Yergin 1977, 176). The Iron Curtain was the Eastern surface of Europe. It defined Europe’s limits and liminality. The eastern boundary was the farthest extension of European identity. It had physical location, like the North Cape, and it had texture. Instead of ice, it had the texture of steel. The hardness and finality of the Iron Curtain warned away any who would be daring or foolhardy enough to traverse it. The boundary of Europe never lost the character that Churchill gave it. Yet gradually it was redefined and re-symbolized. Guard dogs, barbed wire, land mines, and the Berlin Wall extended it in space and time.

The Atlantic and the Mediterranean opened Europe to the west and south. Within the Cold War’s negative frame and the sheltering umbrella of the Atlantic alliance, the positive dynamic of European cooperation and integration could occur. Inside these boundaries, Europe tended its garden. The center of Europe lay in the northwest. In the face of the Communist threat, France and Germany had a dominant national security interest in putting behind them their historical enmity. The spatial center of Europe consisted of the original six countries, bound together by a foundational skeleton also laid down in iron metaphor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Building on this core, another organization, the Western European Union, allowed the major European powers to control possible German rearmament.

As we have recounted, Western leaders needed to help restore the confidence of Western European publics in their abilities to reconstruct their world in the light of their own visions and dreams. Just as the military pillar of nuclear weapons balanced the conventional forces of the Soviet Union, so the political pillar of the European Community balanced the economic force of Central and Eastern Europe. The early steps of the European Community constructed the economic dimension of the counterweight to the Soviet Union. The ECSC was solidly based on converging economic self-interests of France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. The “spill-over” of these interests in peaceful “security communities” implied the constructive evolution of ECSC institutions, tasks, and membership through the integrative learning of a

An outer circle of European cooperation originally consisted of those states outside the original six that desired a looser form of association. The European Free Trade Area initially provided an institutional setting for European fellow travelers. This periphery of European space and activity was gradually pulled in as many of these reluctant partners were brought into closer relations with the center. The center came to include additional layers of states and tasks. Formal neutrals like Switzerland, Austria, and Finland developed networks of relations with Europe. The West was also able to fish successfully at the edges of the Communist bloc, helping Hungary and Yugoslavia to become more independent and prosperous.

The periphery of Historical Europe had always blended into central and eastern Europe. This was also true for Cold War Europe, and the magnetic pull of the center, embedded in the Atlantic Community, eventually helped to bring down the Berlin Wall, the alliance of Eastern European states and their Communist parties, and the Soviet Union.

Post–Cold War Europe

Europeans toast the end of the Cold War story, but there is a residue at the bottom of the wine glass. The myth of the Cold War has lost much of its power with the disappearance of the Enemy. Paradoxically, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have also helped to undermine Europe’s collective belief and purpose and, with them, Europe’s common identity. Cold War Europe contained within itself the seeds of what would emerge, but the new identity of post–Cold War Europe remains unclear. We can, however, try to sketch certain important parts of an emerging narrative. This story contains three major components, the death of the ancien régime, the Cold War, and the legacy of the legitimate heir, Europe-Maastricht, and the dark shadow of the half-sister taken from the brothers Grimm, Europe-Sarajevo.

Cold War Europe is Dead

The Cold War has come to an end. It is over as an experienced myth, even if historical narratives continue to be written (e.g., Brinkley 1992; McCullough 1992). The war between good and evil is finished. The democratic Western allies won the Cold War. The myth of the Cold War is generally accepted as a true story, cosmologically and practically. The theory was confirmed by hard evidence. A deadly, evil Enemy—concrete and observable—was finally destroyed.

Western leaders had political virtue. Their wise policy of balancing and containment, prudence and perseverance, was vindicated (Isaacs and Thomas 1986). Their truth finally brought the Cold War to a close. As the myth predicted, the truth has made us free.

The Soviet regime collapsed like the czarist regime that preceded it. The Soviet Union has dissolved into the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose collection of the former Russian empire’s component parts. The arms race and the threat of nuclear war have receded. Totalitarianism has disappeared in the European context. Lenin and Stalin have finally passed away, their heirs and legacy scattered. The Soviet Union is gone; the Communist Party has disintegrated as a dominant political force. If contemporary empirical research in international relations tells us anything, it is about the close relationship between democracy and peace. We are, as popular writers tell us, in the springtime of democracy and at the end of history. As the superordinate category of evil itself—defined in the Cold War narrative—has disappeared, so the litany of subordinate evils, particularly war, should soon follow into the dusty archives of past narratives.

Yet the end of the Cold War has created a crisis for Atlantic institutions, particularly those involving military security. The Atlantic Alliance has lost its raison d’être, the external Enemy; it has lost the cohesive power of hate and fear produced by the threatening Communist Other. The friends are still friends—after all, they are democrats. And NATO can even expand. However, as it does so, its purpose and identity disintegrate. In the absence of compelling danger, friends often go separate ways. They have separate interests that are not always easy to coordinate, even in the face of security problems like the Balkan War (Levine 1992).

Europe-Maastricht Beckons

Churchill dramatized the balance of terror in the metaphor of two scorpions in a bottle, each poised to sting the other to death. One of the scorpions has disappeared, not with a bang but a whimper, not through nuclear devastation but from economic exhaustion. The other is deeply damaged. The Soviet Union is America’s vanquished foe, but also a possible prophecy of America’s future. The United States is, at least briefly, the sole remaining superpower. Yet America’s unipolar moment is troubled by the enormous economic and social sequelae of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakening of the United States have increased the relative weight of all other players, especially Europe. In this context of exhausted adversaries, Europe is, in Johan Galtung’s phrase, an emerging superpower.

Between Maastricht and Sarajevo
The center of Europe reborn is Europe-Maastricht, named after the city where a central agreement leading to the common European currency was forged. Maastricht is the living symbol of the new Europe, embodying hopes for a common European identity born of rational self-interest and positive reinforcement. The Treaty of Maastricht speaks the language of instrumental rationality, of a currency union that will rationalize resources and lead to greater wealth for all, but the more important issue is that of identity. Behind the Eurooptimists lies the idea that giving up national control over currencies reflects a more fundamental shift in political identity away from national to supranational units. For the Eurooptimists it is not a matter of economics being less important than identity. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is precisely because material life and its institutional substructures are so important that the willingness to begin changing the locus of control must symbolize the potential for a shift in center of political authority. Europe’s emerging identity is shaped by instrumental rationality but has much greater ambitions for the creation of a new Europe and new Europeans. Self-interest will lead to a new European Self, dare one even say a new European Soul?

Nevertheless, the new European narrative and identity are increasingly fragmented. Without the dynamic, focusing power of fear, greed alone may not be enough to structure completely political reality. The European superpower emerges, but with deep political problems of its own. Europe is no longer compressed, constrained, distorted, diminished, dwarfed, and stunted by the Cold War and the Atlantic Alliance. The earthshaking fall of the wall has loosened and disturbed other structures. The same post–Cold War dynamic of exhaustion and deconstruction that destroyed the Soviet Union and has seriously weakened the United States is also at work in Western Europe.

Even with the excitement of the new Eurocurrency, a major event, the European Community labors heavily in troubled waters. European moviemakers and farmers resist harmonization into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The future of the new money is still not entirely clear. The potential economic benefits of deeper union have met obvious strong resistance from some groups inside the Community and some European states outside of it.

Europe-Maastricht is an heir of the Cold War; it implies centers and peripheries similar to those that have gone before. The core states remain poles of power and growth. Interestingly, France, Germany, and the Benelux nations—in the core of the original six—have wished to move ahead most rapidly with the steps toward enhanced monetary cooperation after Maastricht. Around the latest turn in the track, the same racers, joined by some others, still lead the pack. But European Monetary Union has been transformed into a multi-speed vehicle where the historical sovereign governments of many individual European nation-states will continue, at least partly, to determine their own trajectories and velocities.

The two Germanys have finally achieved reunification, but its future and consequences are unclear. The effects of the new Germany on wider European relations run in different directions. German vision and economic strength help to pull Europe forward. Yet this Grossdeutschland frightens many of its neighbors whose long historical memories of the kaiser and theführer do not always match those of some Germans. Germany’s current situation has a similarly ambivalent impact on Germans themselves (Kopstein and Richter 1992). Germans dreamed of reunification for half a century; now they are reunited and families have been brought back together. Yet the wall has left lasting scars; pains balance joys. The German family is one of richer Westi uncles and aunts and poorer Ossi cousins sharing the same house. West Germans have paid the price of reunification in higher taxes, unemployment, and inflation, as well as refugees and racist violence. East Germans, who enjoyed the dignity, security, and distance of their own state and society, have ironically also paid many of the same costs. In addition, they have had to accept their inferiority and subordination, a new living situation and lifestyle that does not always seem better to all than what went before (cf. Priebe and Hickey 1991; Maaz 1990).

Elsewhere in Western Europe, political scandals, scattered violence, resurgent nationalism and subnationalism, and group identification along ethnic boundaries all indicate continuing serious divisions (Moulyhan 1993; Greenfield 1992).

EUROPE-SARAJEVO THREATENS

At the far eastern end of Cold War Europe’s periphery, the repressed and denied world of Central and Eastern Europe lurks as Europe-Sarajevo. It is the remainder, containing everything missing from Europe-Maastricht. Europe-Sarajevo is the world without—without borders, without electricity. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe continue an earlier imperial collapse, the deconstruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Czechs and Slovaks, Ruthenians and Ukrainians, Rumanians and Magyars, Croats and Serbs, Bulgars and Pomaks—each has more weight and freedom. These groups and others struggle for the separate identity, the autonomous narrative, the emotional satisfaction, that was earlier denied to them through the long centuries of imperial history, the long preceding history of Balkan crises, and, in this century, the Cold War.

Between Maastricht and Sarajevo
Sarajevo, calling on the deeper heritage of Historical Europe, symbolizes something altogether different from Europe-Maastricht: Balkan crises redux. The images of division and subdivision, the bodily rhetoric of physical destruction, of brother killing brother tell us that the “United States of Europe” is a story that is a long way from pan-European adoption. If there is an underlying instrumental rationality in the Balkans, then this only indicates that rationality does not always lead to peaceful, unified, or even humane political outcomes. A further possibility runs to the core of all assumptions of European unity. Not only are the cultural commonalities of the European heritage not as binding as many might like them to be, but the dissection of Bosnia is only the latest demonstration that identities bend slowly to the iron logic of instrumental rationality.

The map of Cold War Europe could be drawn as it was because Central and Eastern Europe were defined as at least partly Asiatic and, therefore, out of Europe. Yet, Central and Eastern Europe were not only more Asiatic, they were also more authentically European. They were more Asiatic because of the great eastern reaches and autocratic history of the Soviet Empire. They were more European because of their distance from another Other; a repressed Enemy within, more potent for being integrated with the Self. This Enemy was the United States, whose dominant postwar position allowed an ongoing military, economic, and cultural penetration. It was more powerful for being unacknowledged, avoided, and denied. Cold War Europe was an identity imposed at least partly from the outside—based on a victor’s justice, inscribed in a victor’s story. Cold War Europe, in this light, identified with the aggressor. Central and Eastern Europe remained more alien and more alienated. They were farther on the distance gradient, less violated, more pure.

With the Soviet collapse, Central and Eastern Europe offer the possibility of an ethical fiction (Booth 1988). They present at least the symbolic opportunity to dissolve the morass of manipulation, the web of fear and greed, the moral corruption articulated by Böll and Fassbinder. Following Grass, it may now be possible to reverse the standard Cold War escape story, to escape to the east. In that light, East Germany is the real Germany: Dresden is a city that looked as German cities would have looked if Germany had won the war; Budapest is a more authentic Vienna. Ironically, Historical Europe has survived Cold War Europe. Historical Europe still lives in the east, separate from American-occupied Europe, its purity protected from the protracted rape of the last half-century by the superficial veneer, the apparent ugliness, of oriental despotism.

New and Old Worlds in Order and Disorder

Today’s Europe appears in shades of postmodern darkness and scattered light, worlds of virtual reality connected as hypertexts, bricolage in a cyberpunk nouveau roman, sans clef, degré zéro. The Cold War was a war, but it was not a shooting war—except occasionally in the alleys and subterranean passages of The Third Man and Smiley’s world, the streets and squares of Warsaw or Prague, the mountains of Afghanistan, the jungles of Angola or Nicaragua. The dominant mode of Cold War was “virtual warfare,” an Orwellian twilight zone where peace was war and war was peace. War was not “hot war” but “cold war.” Not the Clausewitzian war of physical friction but Virilio’s and Lotringer’s war of pure fiction. In a sense, the Cold War was fought on television; in the United States it existed just after Jeopardy and before The Brady Bunch.

In the post-Cold War period, peaceful coexistence is transformed to take new referents and meanings. Europe is multiple coexisting worlds in constant internal change and external motion. There may be a New World Order, but it is ordered in much different, more complex, and discontinuous ways than what preceded it—with both too many and too few characters and plots. In contemporary European narratives, the boundaries and locations of images transform and displace each other. Criteria of identity and difference, production and reproduction, economics and psychology, appear and disappear, shift and blur, come together and move apart dissolving any attempts at closure (cf. Bourdieu 1993; Derrida 1992; Attali 1991; Baudrillard 1983).

Europe’s worlds are past, present, and future all in cohabitation. Cold War Europe now settles as one among many narratives and identities in the archives of Historical Europe, its orthodox received wisdom to be sifted with all the other lessons of European history. Present Europe contains the past, but not necessarily in the orderly linear form, sorted neatly by ideological keys, with which we are familiar. For example, the symbolic lexicon contains multiple entries under Sarajevo. If these are organized by reference to standard major events and put in sequential chronological order, a partial list might look something like this:

1429. Fell to the Turks.
1878. Awarded to Austria-Hungary at the Congress of Berlin.
1914. Site of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife and the immediate cause of the chain of events leading directly to World War I.
1918. Incorporated into Yugoslavia.
Merely to begin making such a list exposes its arbitrariness. There is no law that specifies historical experience as a list, or Gregorian dates as major organizing categories of such a list. Lived experience and life worlds are broader and deeper, more and less continuous than such a list-narrative suggests.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (1993) writes that the modern world is out of control, lacking the coherence of either internal or external discipline. It is fashionable to believe that the center cannot hold. Perhaps. But one must ask which center, out of whose control? The Cold War myth is gone, leaving challenges of adaptation and evolution. The corseted stability of Cold War Europe was a frame for the European Community. It contained the rational logic and enhanced the empirical probability of functionalist linear progress toward European integration. Whether the elites that dominated the Cold War can maintain and continue the myth, and the Europe-Maastricht identity that follows from it, through the next generations remains to be proven in the order and disorder, continuity and discontinuity, of a rapidly changing post-Cold War world.

We have not reached the end of history, but rather the end of a particular interpretation and episode of history. The myth and identity of Cold War Europe have ended. New worlds and new Europes are, as always, struggling to be born. As the stories and identities of the compelling Europe-Maastricht and the repellant Europe-Sarajevo move forward through hyperspace, the new post-Cold War Europes jettison and leave behind the shards of Historical Europe, already receding from the distant horizons of memory. Yet, as Historical Europe remains in its own ash heap, it is simultaneously recycled. The new worlds carry history forward as memory at the same time that they leave it behind as experience. Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, De Gasperi, and Spaak are permanently inscribed as icons of supranational identity in the canon of the new Europe. Yet de Gaulle and Thatcher, articulating the continuing pull of traditional national identities, are also new European prophets. The new Europes approach the millennium carrying also the ghostly epiphanies of Augustine and Aquinas, Saint Peter and Saint James, Saint Francis and Saint Cyril, Luther and Zwingli; the imperial dreams of Charlemagne and Attila; Ferdinand and Isabella, Catherine and Frederick the Greats, Napoleon and Victoria, Franz Josef and Tsar Nicholas; the diplomatic combinations of Richelieu, Talleyrand, Metternich, and Bismarck, of Castlereagh, Canning, and Disraeli; the nationalist visions of Garibaldi and Mazzini; the poetic dreams of Dante and Milton; the drama of Chaucer and Cervantes, Proust, Mann, and Joyce, Shakespeare and Shaw, Tchekhov, Tolstoy, and Turgenev, Musil and Andric; the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Erasmus, Descartes and Leibniz, Bentham and Rosseau, Hobbes and Locke, Hegel and Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and, yes, Heidegger; the artistic genius of Rembrandt and Rubens, Monet and Picasso; the music of Mozart, Chopin, Wagner, Tchaikovsky; the separatist hopes of Herzl and Jabotinsky and countless other public and private identities, narratives, and myths.

The myths, with their heroes and villains, connect political communities. Leaders and audiences, citizens and subjects, retell and reenact them as part of their everyday individual and collective lives. Thought, discourse, and behavior assume an identity within the overarching, culturally shared narrative. World War I, the interwar period, World War II, the Cold War, the post–Cold War period—these are part of the fabric and the material that the myths represent and form in the meaning that surrounds and incorporates war and peace.