Beyond Dictatorship and Democracy: Rethinking National Minority Inclusion and Regime Type in Interwar Eastern Europe

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Abstract
Most standard models of democratization privilege class-based actors and the regimes they prefer to account for patterns of dictatorship and democracy. These models are ill suited, however, to explain political regime change in interwar Eastern Europe, where the dominant cleavage was not class but nationality. As a consequence, neither the process of regime change nor the resulting regime outcomes in Eastern Europe conform to the standard Western European models. Through a detailed analysis of key episodes of regime change in interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland, the authors explore the different ethnic and social coalitions on which political authority was built and the circumstances under which these two countries made the transition from one regime type to another. The depth of the ethnic divide meant that sustaining democracy in Eastern Europe required sidelining the urban

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bourgeoisie of the majority ethnic group from a dominant role in political life, a finding quite at odds with common views of the origins of democracy.

**Keywords**
Eastern Europe, democratization, regime type, structured episode, ethnic conflict

One of the most important and intensely studied questions in politics is why some countries eventually become democracies whereas others slide into or remain mired in dictatorial rule. Although there is still little consensus on all the factors that differentiate democracies from dictatorships, one seemingly robust distinguishing feature is sufficient socioeconomic development. Important exceptions such as Weimar Germany notwithstanding, a diverse range of studies has shown that on the whole more developed countries are likelier than less developed ones to become and remain a democracy (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1996; Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1981; Luebbert, 1991; Moore, 1966; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). The details of the otherwise heterogeneous arguments within this body of theory are less important for our purposes than two key similarities that they share. First, on the whole they privilege “modern” actors as the groups whose preferences for democracy or dictatorship are the principal determinant of regime outcomes. Workers, peasants, farmers, landowners, the bourgeoisie, the rich, and the poor are given far more agency than, say, “premodern” ethnic and religiously based actors. Second, and relatedly, the range of regime outcomes is closely tethered to which group or groups ultimately succeed in gaining power. For Moore (1966), to take one example, it is not a huge exaggeration to conclude that bourgeois dominance leads to democracy, landed-class dominance to fascism, and peasant dominance to communism.

The lingering draw of such arguments has in no small part been because of their perceived successes in accounting for democratic outcomes, particularly in interwar Western Europe, though even this has been challenged (e.g., Ertman, 1998). We argue, by contrast, that received models of Western democratization are of limited use in understanding the dynamics of regime change in interwar Eastern Europe. Scholars disagree on whether Eastern Europe and Western Europe belong in the same universe of cases for purposes of studying democratization. Among those who believe they do, such as Luebbert (1991), the standard view is that with the exception of Czechoslovakia,
whose democratic stability is typically attributed to its bourgeois character, the region was too backward to sustain anything other than traditional authoritarianism. In our opinion this interpretation seriously misreads the dilemmas these countries faced and the solutions that resulted. It is true that in the aftermath of World War I countries in both East and West faced the dilemma of how to incorporate vast numbers of citizens into mass politics. Yet in the West the most important such group was the industrial working class, whereas in the East, as we argue, it was national minorities. This was true even in Czechoslovakia, where socialist and communist parties were important political players, the latter having even posed a serious threat to democracy in the early years of the republic (Capoccia, 2005, p. 74). Yet even the communists formed a unified party only at Moscow’s insistence (Heimann, 2009, p. 54), and solidarity within the larger socialist movement remained hampered by ethnic divisions between Germans and Czechs. We argue that the national question, which in the West had by and large been resolved by the interwar period, posed an entirely different set of challenges for the East (also see Bunce, 2000; Ertman, 1998, Notes 5 and 7).

Our argument adopts some of the structural characteristics of the standard models but enlarges the space of politically relevant social groups and expands the set of regime outcomes that results as a consequence of these groups’ political incorporation. First, we argue that the predominance of the national cleavage impeded mobilization along class lines and opened up new coalitional possibilities. Second, we claim that the manner in which national minorities were politically included implies a different way of understanding interwar regime types. What emerged in the East does not quite conform to received understandings of democratic corporatism, traditional authoritarianism, or fascism, as in Luebbert’s typology, and is more akin to what would later occur in deeply divided Third World societies than to anything happening in Western Europe of the period.

Third, we explore regime types through a detailed exploration of key “reform episodes” in Czechoslovakia and Poland, in particular the parliamentary crises of 1925-1926 (Capoccia & Ziblatt, IN PRESS). The interwar starting points of both countries evince remarkable parallels. Both were constructed from the remnants of former empires, Czechoslovakia from the Habsburg and Poland largely from the Russian. Both comprised territories of vastly different histories and levels of economic development. Both were ethnically heterogeneous, with minorities making up roughly one third of each country’s population. Both had democracy and respect for minority rights foisted on them as a condition for international recognition, yet both found the means to evade at least part of their commitments. Both adopted
highly proportional electoral systems that produced fragmented parliaments and shifting political coalitions. Yet despite these similarities, at key turning points the coalitions on which power was based were different, yielding very different modes of ethnic incorporation and regime types. Moreover, although these two countries appear on the surface to validate arguments about the importance of the bourgeoisie in securing democracy (the middle class in Poland, where democracy collapsed, having been notably less influential than in Czechoslovakia), a careful analysis of actual events during key episodes of regime transition, as recommended by Capoccia and Ziblatt (IN PRESS), shows that quite the opposite is true: Sustaining democracy required sideling the ethnically titular bourgeoisie and its most ardent party defenders in parliament. Contrary to the standard view but consistent with Collier (1999), we show that regimes in these countries emerged as a consequence not of more or less unmediated conflict among social actors but of how political elites—and in particular party elites (Capoccia & Ziblatt, IN PRESS)—navigated national and class cleavages.

**The National Cleavage in Eastern Europe**

Although the avowed intention of the Paris peace conference was the long-sought goal of national determination for the peoples of the region, in practice a combination of political expediency, Allied desire to punish the defeated powers, and the intermixed geographical distribution of national groups precluded such a neatly defined outcome (Macmillan, 2003). What emerged instead from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires was a set of countries in which there was a substantial mismatch between state and national boundaries. Thompson (2002) usefully distinguishes within this group between what he terms “undersized” and “oversized” states. Undersized states such as Austria and Hungary (and Germany) were the rump states of former empires whose state borders no longer encompassed all members of their respective national communities. The postwar peace treaties left millions of former Austrian Germans as citizens of Czechoslovakia and millions more Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

Although the revanchism of undersized states (and Germany in particular) ultimately proved fatal to the postwar Versailles order, our main focus is on the more numerous oversize states, whose borders encompassed not just the eponymous nationality of the state but other nationalities as well. By virtually any measure these countries were deeply divided along national lines. First, the minorities were demographically weighty. In both Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example, the “titular” nation comprised approximately 65% of all
inhabitants. In Czechoslovakia, Germans constituted 22% of the population, outnumbering Slovaks, and significant Hungarian and Ruthenian minorities lived in concentrated areas outside of the Bohemian heartland. In Poland, Ukrainians composed 15% of the population, concentrated in the East and Southeastern part of the country; Jews made up 10% of all inhabitants and were dispersed throughout hundreds of cities and small towns. Romania and Latvia were only slightly more homogenous, with majorities of 72% and 73%, respectively. In none of these instances were minorities large enough to constitute a demographic threat to the majority, but they were also too large for majorities to ignore (Eberhardt, 1996).

Second, normal economic and political conflict often took place against an ethnic backdrop. For example, political movements representing different interests were typically divided along national lines. In Czechoslovakia both the Czechs-Slovaks and the Germans enjoyed a full spectrum of parties spanning left to right. Only the Communist Party remained multinational. Poland was even more divided. There the Jews and Ukrainians, much like the Germans in Czechoslovakia, supported a diverse array of their own ethnic parties. But even the communist movement, symbol of universalism par excellence, featured Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, and Belarussian versions.

Third, tensions between majorities and minorities were heightened because of the reversal of ethnic fortunes that occurred when former subject peoples such as Czechs, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Romanians, and Slovaks came to rule over formerly dominant groups such as Germans, Hungarians, and Russians (Riga & Kennedy, 2009, pp. 464-465). Freed from the dominance of the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian Empires, the new majority peoples considered themselves the “owners” of their respective states and bristled against any arrangements that might diminish the quality of that ownership. Of course the new ruling elites were not free to do entirely as they pleased. The treaties that brought forth these states included relatively liberal citizenship requirements, thus precluding the sorts of measures employed by the Baltic states in the early 1990s, in which ethnic Russians were denied voting rights through restrictive language provisions. There would be no ethnic restrictions on the franchise. The treaties also provided for a range of minority cultural rights, including the substantial though not unlimited right to education in and public use of their native languages. This, together with the presence of neighboring national homelands and resistance to assimilation into what were perceived as more “backward” cultures, precluded the more brutal forms of nation-building that were characteristic of Western Europe in earlier eras. Yet at the same time the treaties eschewed imposing federal, consociational, or other institutional arrangements that might have
stabilized these new democracies. This proved to be fateful because the new majority elites were still faced with the problem of how to contain minority political influence.

**Modes of Ethnic Incorporation in Interwar Eastern Europe**

The issues facing the “oversized” states were more akin to those facing contemporary deeply divided societies than to those of their more ethnically homogenous western neighbors of the era. As in deeply divided societies today, there was a tension between the rights of the majority to implement its preferred policies and the rights of minority groups to their own particular way of life (see Smooha, 2005). This tension was particularly fraught in the nation-alizing states of Eastern Europe (Brubaker, 1996). The question for majority elites in the “oversized” states was how to reconcile reaping the rewards of state ownership, which included asserting the preeminence of the majority language and culture throughout the entire territory, with the presence of substantial and geographically concentrated minority populations that sought to preserve as much autonomy as they could. As noted above, majority elites were not completely free to do as they pleased with their new states. In practice, however, once the new states were established there was substantial leeway in terms of both the degree to which minority rights were recognized in practice and how vigorously the state could promote the majority culture. The intersection of these two dimensions—the degree to which minority rights are recognized in practice and the degree of state neutrality—yields a number of potential modes of minority inclusion, which we illustrate in Figure 1.

Figure 1 is more conceptual than empirical, although the placement of regime types is meant to correspond, in an impressionistic way, to their actual location in the space. Some of the labels may appear unfamiliar in a European context, but this is as it should be—the regime types that emerge where the national cleavage is dominant, such as in contemporary deeply divided societies, often do not correspond to the familiar ones from Western Europe. Let us begin by describing the ideal-typical regime types that were never actual-ized. Pure consociationalism maximizes minority group rights to a distinct identity while featuring a state that would not favor one group over another (Lijphart, 1977). No ruling nationality in Eastern Europe was prepared to grant to other important national groups the rights it arrogated to itself as the “owner” of the state. Moving from the lower left to the upper left of the figure, we find liberal democracy and nonethnic autocracy. These are regimes in which no minority group rights are recognized and where the state does
not favor the majority nationality at the expense of the minorities. This liberal democratic regime type is not to be confused with “republican liberal democracy” as found in contemporary France and the United States, in which there is a civic “supercommunity,” promoted by the state, to which all citizens are expected to assimilate (Smooha, 2005). In liberal democracy national groups enjoy no collective rights, the state remains neutral, and ethnicity is a private matter. Among those drafting the postwar peace treaties, one of the motivations behind granting the minorities qua groups cultural but not political rights was the hope that tamping down ethnic tensions would foster a more diffuse political loyalty to the state. Such loyalty could in principle have formed the basis of a civic identity that was open to citizens regardless of national affiliation, leading to a republican liberal democracy (Riga & Kennedy, 2009, p. 465).
The authoritarian twin of liberal democracy is nonethnic autocracy, a regime in which the autocrat does not play ethnic favorites or, expressed less optimistically, represses all ethnic groups more or less equally. The communist regimes that would later rule Eastern Europe come closest to this type of autocracy. Finally, in the upper right corner we have ethnic autocracy, in which minorities' rights are not recognized and the majority group exploits its control of the state for its own ends.

The actual regimes in interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland only approximated some of these ideal types. As alluded to above, at the outset of democracy both Czechs-Slovaks and Poles, keen to take ownership of their respective states, opted for majoritarian voting rules that granted to minorities no more political influence (and usually less) than their population proportions warranted. This ensured comfortable Czech-Slovak and Polish majorities in parliament and allowed the majority to freeze the minority out of power if the parties of the ethnic majority, which were often riven with ideological divisions, could agree on how to allocate power among themselves. Smooha (2002) has termed this combination of democracy for all with the ascendancy of a particular national group “ethnic democracy.” Both the Czechoslovak and Polish regimes approximated ethnic democracy for the first several years of their existence.

Alternatively, the minorities could be granted a share in power and included regularly into government through allocating their parties’ cabinet portfolios or other state positions even when this is not strictly speaking necessary, an outcome Smooha calls multicultural democracy but we term quasi-consociationalism. The qualifier quasi indicates that such parliamentary cooperation was not legally enshrined—it had to remain a matter of practice rather than principle. Furthermore, it was less important that national minorities always occupy important state posts than that such an outcome remained a credible possibility. However, it was crucial that the state itself, regardless of the ethnic makeup of particular governments, not show excessive favor to the majority nationality. This situation characterized Czechoslovakia beginning with the entry of German parties into the cabinet in 1926, after the 1925 elections (Kleptař, 1937, pp. 213-242).

Quasi-consociationalism in Czechoslovakia required the Czechs and Slovaks to agree to cede power to the minorities even when their demographic dominance and control of the state did not strictly require it. When such intra-majority agreement proved infeasible or undesirable, as in the case of Poland from the mid-1920s through the mid-1930s, there was an authoritarian option we call multiethnic autocracy. Here the state, keen to preserve stability, guides minority groups to cooperate on strategically important
issues. In fact, multiethnic autocracy had been the historical pattern in the Habsburg monarchy and to a lesser extent in the Russian and German Empires, where ethnic minorities had traditionally looked to kaisers and czars as the guarantors of traditional cultural rights. In interwar Poland the minorities and the Jews in particular, looked on the Piłsudski regime (1926-1935) as a relatively benevolent alternative to both ethnic democracy and fascistoid exclusion (Mendelsohn, 1983). The difference between quasi-consociationalism and multiethnic autocracy lies less in the content or scope of minority rights than in the political mechanisms by which such rights are realized.

Fascistoid describes a regime where the majority ethnic group opts to dispense with both democracy and any semblance of cooperation with minority groups, as happened in Poland after the death of the dictator Piłsudski in 1935. We term it fascistoid rather than fascist because although government policies were sometimes inspired by fascism, there was never the kind of widespread paramilitary organization or state-sponsored violence typical of such regimes. After 1935 rightist Polish governments openly committed to institutionalizing Polish economic, cultural, and political dominance initiated increasingly discriminatory laws against the Jews, tolerated a degree of majority violence, and expropriated minority wealth for the benefit of ethnic Poles. A fascistoid regime is the authoritarian twin of ethnic democracy and more liberal than outright fascism.

In what follows, we explore the political and social coalition supporting each regime type and outline the processes underlying the transitions from one regime type to the other in the cases of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The episode we focus on is the parliamentary crises of 1926. In both cases, after this date, a key institutional feature of both countries—how minority interests would be represented—was set for the next decade.

To preface the argument, one item that does emerge from a closer consideration of Figure 1 is that the terms democratization and democratic collapse, as least as conventionally understood, do not fully capture what happened in these two countries. In Czechoslovakia, regime change involved a shift from ethnic democracy to quasi-consociationalism, or rather between two types of democracy. What distinguishes the two types is not the level of democracy but the degree to which individual rights are privileged over group ones. The shift was thus from a more (individually) liberal system to a less liberal one. Poland, by contrast, did experience a democratic collapse in 1926, but then underwent what might be termed authoritarianization when it moved from multiethnic autocracy, which provided for some group rights, to a more exclusionary fascistoid regime.
Between Ethnic Democracy and Political Inclusion, 1919–1926

The Founding Coalition: Czechoslovakia

Until recently the accepted wisdom among historians was that Czechs were democrats and Poles were nationalists. This rough and ready analysis is no longer accepted (see King, 2002). The early years of the Czechoslovak republic did not portend well for minority groups. The constitution was drawn up without their participation, and before the first parliamentary election in 1920, the leadership, including Premier Karel Kramář and finance minister Alois Rašin, was drawn from the highly nationalist National Democratic Party and the first Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia, Václav Klofáč, led the radically anti-German Czechoslovak National Socialists (Benes, 1973; Kelly, 2006). Under the leadership of both, and other parties of the Left and Right, this first “all-national” (meaning purely Czechoslovak) government asserted ethnic ownership of the state and initiated the process of ethnic redistribution that is characteristic of an ethnic democracy. It defeated separatist and nationalist challenges from both German and Hungarian areas and established the final borders of the country; it Czechified the national bureaucracy and the educational system, imposed a tough language law that restricted the use of languages other than Czech to districts where the local minority exceeded 20%, and quietly let German manufacturers know that only those enterprises employing a certain percentage of Czechs would receive lucrative government contracts (Kleptař, 1937, pp. 45-89). Most importantly it initiated a land reform aimed at large German and Hungarian landowners (Rothschild, 1974, pp. 89-107; Wiskemann, 1967, p. 152). These last two policies led to important demographic changes in the country, as Czechs moved into towns to take German jobs and Czech settlers moved onto land they received from German landowners.

The exclusion of minorities’ parties from government after 1920 was complete. Although there was some discussion of co-opting the German Agrarians, the German Christian Socials, or the German Social Democrats, the conditions were deemed unacceptable and the spoils from state ownership at this founding stage were still too large for the Czechs to share power with Germans: The dominant Czechoslovak discourse held the Germans to be essentially disloyal (Boyer, 2004, p. 121). Germans had lost too much from the creation of the state and could not be trusted, so the argument ran, to work within the confines of Czechoslovak political dominance.
German allegiance to German parties in the early years of the republic is borne out if we examine available data for the 1925 national parliamentary election, the first in which the Germans took part en masse. The 1921 census is known to be biased in overcounting Czechs at the expense of Germans. Thus, to gauge the extent of ethnic voting we examine the performance of German parties in municipalities where even the Czech census takers reported a German majority of 99% or greater. Across 344 such localities for which we have complete data, German parties received 93% of the vote. This figure slightly underestimates the actual proportion because some of those registered as German may have been German-speaking Jews who opted for non-German parties. Clearly, given the size of the German minority, integrating Germans into the political order would entail including their parties in government. This was theoretically possible because the German parties were themselves divided into two main groups, those who had decided to make their peace with the Czechoslovak republic and wanted access to state power and those who rejected it altogether. Yet even for those parties willing to work inside the system, what remained uncertain was whether any Czech party, except perhaps those on the Left, would or could accept them as a coalition partners. This would first require Czechs casting aside ethnic democracy.

Czechoslovakia did in fact abandon ethnic democracy, and the reasons why shed light on a caveat to our claim about the importance of ethnic politics. The all-Czechoslovak coalition could be maintained only insofar as there were material advantages to prolonging it. Yet by 1923 the big distributional gains of ethnic democracy had already been realized and spent. Thereafter intra-Czechoslovak conflicts tore apart the coalition. First, the simmering movement for Slovak autonomy meant that Slovaks could not always be counted on to make common cause with the Czechs. Czechs formed a bare majority of the republic’s population, so without the cooperation of some Slovaks an all-national coalition would have been practically impossible. Second, battles over industrial versus agricultural tariffs and the relative urban and rural tax burdens, as well as social policy, divided Czechs and Slovaks along familiar class-based cleavage lines (Kleptář, 1937, pp. 218-223). On their own these conflicts may have been amenable to corporatist intermediation of the type that Luebbert maintains preserved democracy in Western Europe, but in the end class cleavages were not deep enough to foster the cross-ethnic cooperation such corporatism would have entailed. As we shall see, the prospect of legislative gridlock and the inability to form stable governments led to an adaptation of a corporatist model tailored to the realities of a multiethnic society.
The Founding Coalition: Poland

Poland embarked on independence in a situation not dissimilar from Czechoslovakia. First, minorities comprised roughly a third of the country, though in this case the dominant groups were Ukrainians and Jews rather than Germans and Hungarians. Second, the political system was parliamentary with a majoritarian electoral system and low vote thresholds to enter parliament. This guaranteed the numerical dominance of Poles in the Sejm but also encouraged party fragmentation. The 1922 national elections yielded a parliament consisting of 18 parties, 5 of which had two or fewer seats (Polonsky, 1972, p. 103). The problem is that no party or ideological bloc came close to gaining a majority of the seats. Poles split their vote among the Right, led by the National Democrats (28% of the seats), the bourgeois centrists (30% of the seats), and the parties of the Left, led by the Socialists (22% of the seats). Minorities’ parties won 20% of the seats, a number that underestimates their true strength because these elections were boycotted by a substantial proportion of Galician Ukrainians (Polonsky, 1972).

It should be clear from the above numbers that none of the Polish party blocs could form a majority government without the cooperation of another Polish bloc or with the minorities. Yet although the Poles were as eager as Czech and Slovaks to secure the distributional benefits of owning the state (Polonsky, 1975, pp. 44-48), they were also riven by divisions that inhibited the smooth establishment of an ethnic democracy. One of the most important cleavages had to do with the conditions under which different parties evolved, in particular whether parties were formed in the Habsburg or the Russian partition of Poland (see Polonsky, 1972, pp. 101-103). At the risk of oversimplification, we can say that parties having competed in Habsburg elections, such as Socialists close to Marshal Piłsudski, were far more amenable to cooperating with minorities’ parties than those such as the right-wing National Democrats, which had originated in the Russian partition and had taken on the worst traits of national chauvinism so characteristic of 19th-century Russia (Krzemiński, 1998, pp. 33-44). This division, which ran within as well as between party blocs, precluded both a Center–Left and a Left–Right coalition.

In the end the rightist National Democrats, who had captured a plurality of the 1922 vote, formed a coalition with centrist parties that were otherwise reliably nationalist on minority questions. The policies of this nationalist-dominated coalition made the ethno-national nature of Poland’s democracy all too clear. Polish would be the only official tongue; national minorities could establish their own schools but only at their own expense; Polonization of the bureaucracy, public schools, and religious institutions became official
policy; ethnic Polish military colonists were moved into “insecure” Eastern borderlands; and minority political representatives would be frozen out of all cabinets. The Lanckorona Pact, signed in May 1923 among the coalition members (National Democrats, Piast, and Christian Democrats), called for a limit to legal, cultural, and economic ownership by the country’s national minorities and for dominance of Poles in all area of public life. German public schools were closed in Poznan and Pomerania if attendance dropped below 30 per class, and the use of the word Ukrainian was proscribed in official communication of the organs of public administration. Ukrainians and Belarusians were ripe for forced assimilation; Jews and Germans were not and were to be encouraged to emigrate (Chojnowski, 1979, pp. 29-54). This was the Polish version of ethnic democracy.

The problem for the right-wing coalition is that it could not constitute a stable majority because its seat total left it vulnerable to minor defections (Bernhard, 2005, p. 95). As in Czechoslovakia, once the initial distributional gains from state ownership had been attained, the material basis of the coalition began to crumble. Between 1922 and 1926, several governments tried to formulate and implement viable policies on a broad range of issues having little to do with ethnic politics, but with the support of neither the Left nor the national minorities they could not (Bernhard, 2005, p. 109). Hostility between the Right and the minorities prevented a corporatist solution that would have necessitated interethnic cooperation. The result was legislative gridlock, governmental instability, budgetary impasses, and labor unrest, all of which culminated in Piłsudski’s 1926 coup d’état (Rothschild, 1966). As we shall see, Piłsudski attempted to build his power on a fundamentally different social coalition than the National Democrats, departing from ethnic democracy.

Modes of Minority Incorporation: 1926–1935

The solutions to the legislative crises of 1925-1926 cast in stark relief the differences between the Czechoslovak and Polish experience. Although the Czechs managed to retain their democracy by expanding its ethnic inclusiveness and thereby enacting a broad legislative program of social reform, the Poles could do so only under the institutions of authoritarian ethnic incorporation. Understanding these divergent solutions requires a grounding in the social and political coalitions that made this possible. A focus on this episode, first, shows the importance of the ethnic cleavage in determining regime type outcomes and, second, reveals the key role played by political parties and elites in managing nonclass (and class) cleavages. These are the factors that
shaped the very different regime trajectories taken by Czechoslovakia and Poland.

**Czechoslovakia: Quasi-Consociationalism**

Czechoslovakia’s brush with an authoritarian resolution to coalitional gridlock was closer than is often appreciated. After the “all-national” coalition had become unworkable, elections were held in 1925. Attempts to reconstruct the purely Czech and Slovak government failed in the face of continued differences over social policy and tariffs. Kleptař (1937, p. 238) notes that many politicians now felt that “building a parliamentary majority was impossible in Czechoslovakia, that democracy had played itself out, and a similar outcome to Italy’s fascist dictatorship awaited.” Leading National Democrats and Czech National Socialists drifted into fascist organizations. Czechoslovak President Thomáš Masaryk went so far as to tell a senior colleague “that he was willing to assume dictatorial powers at the end of the year if the parties could not decide on a coalition or provide some direction” (Miller, 1999, p. 153).

Although it is difficult to gauge Masaryk’s commitment to an authoritarian solution, his threat, along with the sheer unworkability of an “all-national” government, a rumored plot for a fascist coup in the summer of 1926, the strong electoral performance of the communists, and, most crucially, the Locarno pact and Germany’s admission to the League of Nations in the fall, convinced the leaders of Czech parties on the Center-Right that the time was appropriate for the Germans to enter the government as part of a grand bourgeois coalition (Miller, 1999, pp. 155-157).

The inclusion of the German Christian Socials and the German Farmers Party in government and the awarding of each a cabinet portfolio occurred without much fanfare but marked a crucial turning point in the history of the republic. Not only did it distribute to each a portion of the spoils in a highly proportional system in which parties were all powerful, but it also led to important changes in policy, especially in the disenfranchisement of the armed forces, which ensured that the Czech majority could no longer use garrisoned forces to garner artificially high numbers of votes in the areas that were overwhelmingly German (Rothschild, 1974, p. 119). This coalitional solution was a precondition for any other form of interest intermediation in subsequent years. In this case, quasi-consociationalism preceded corporatist social democracy by three years when the Social Democrats, both Czechoslovak and German, would enter government in 1929.

Despite the lack of fanfare, the leader of the German Farmers Party, Franz Spina, summed it up best when he said shortly after the election, “No
The German minister in Prague, Walter Koch, echoed Spina’s sentiments in a 10-page report for the Foreign Office in Berlin: “I am convinced that henceforth, in any Cabinet reconstruction, the German group can never again be ignored.” All of this was preceded by foreign minister (and future president) Edvard Beneš’s words uttered before the 1925 election:

> We wish the Germans to render unto the state what is the state’s, and we gladly render unto the Germans what is just to them. . . . [W]e have in our midst three million Germans who are struggling to achieve what any opposition expects, namely, to participate in the government. (Bruegel, 1973, pp. 74-75)

Taken together, these statements were the manifesto of the quasi-consociational arrangements that would solidify the democratic regime type of interwar Czechoslovakia, at least until the economic crisis following the onset of the great depression in Northern Bohemia in the early 1930s and the political crisis following Hitler’s assumption of the chancellorship of Germany in 1933.

If this was corporatism, as Luebbert claims, it was ethnic corporatism. Because it involved little explicit interest intermediation, we prefer the term quasi-consociational. The key to this change of political landscape is the nature of the founding Czechoslovak coalition, especially the growing dominance of the Agrarians over the National Democrats and National Socialists, who were now, at most, junior partners. Although the National Democrats and the even more radically nationalist Czechoslovak National Socialists had been highly active in urban Bohemia and Moravia already under the Habsburgs, the Agrarians managed to outflank them (Carver, 1978, p. 347; Kelly, 2006; Miller, 1999). First, although the Agrarian-initiated land reform did disproportionately affect Germans and Hungarians, not all members of these ethnic groups were large landowners, and a significant proportion were, in fact, distributional beneficiaries of the reform, receiving small to medium parcels of land. Second, the Agrarians outperformed both the bourgeois National Democrats and white- and blue-collar-based Czechoslovak National Socialists in organizational work. While the National Democrats tended their intellectual salons catering to Czech businessmen and the Czechoslovak National Socialists restricted themselves to ethnic Czechs in urban areas, the Agrarians performed the sober, slow work of organizing the countryside while never losing their profile in the smaller towns (Miller, 1999, pp. 17-25).
Most importantly, however, the Agrarians picked up large numbers of votes among the national minorities. The Agrarians’ success among Hungarians and Ruthenians is clear if we examine settlement-level voting results for the 1929 national parliamentary elections (matched with 1930 census data). To estimate the proportion of a national group voting for that group’s political parties given census and electoral data for settlements, we employ ecological inference techniques. The best of these methods combines deterministic information about the possible values of the quantity of interest (in this case the fraction of Hungarians or Ruthenians in a locality that could hypothetically have supported the Agrarian party) with a statistical model of what the most likely values of those quantities are within that range of possibilities. For example, if there was a municipality that had 90% Hungarians and the Agrarians received 5% of the vote, then we know that at most 5.5% (5/90) of the Hungarians could have supported the Agrarians, and possibly none at all. The range of possible Hungarian support for the Agrarians is thus (0, 5.5). The goal of ecological inference is to estimate where in that range the actual level of support is most likely to be. We employ the methods described in Rosen, Jiang, King, and Tanner (2001) and Wittenberg, Alimadhi, Bhaskar, and Lau (2007).

According to our calculations, across more than 3,000 municipalities in Slovakia in 1929, 20% of Slovaks (with a 95% confidence interval of 19, 21) and 11% of Hungarians (confidence interval = 10, 12) supported the Agrarians, whereas 26% of Ruthenians (confidence interval = 25, 28) supported them across 414 communities in Sub-Carpathian Rus—and this in a contest in which the Agrarians received 15% of the vote nationally (and retained its top ranking among all parties). Although it is true that the Agrarian lists in the non-Czech areas frequently constituted careful coalitions with local autonomists, this ability to bring other groups under their umbrella gave them the wherewithal to work with the largest of the groups, the Germans, in subsequent years. Ultimately the success with which the Agrarians found a way between the ethnically Czech project of the National Democrats and National Socialists and the need to construct a multinational coalition enabled them to become the senior coalition partner and steadily reduce the influence of both the National Democrats and the National Socialists. The Agrarian-led collaboration with the German parties began in 1926 and stabilized the regime for the next decade.

Among the few scholars of West European politics who consider the Czechoslovak case, Luebbert shares our appreciation of the role of the Agrarians, but for him their contribution is in mobilizing the rural proletariat into politics before the Social Democrats could do so, and in this way forestalling a fear of
socialism among the middle peasants who would have otherwise drifted into fascism in defense of their property rights, as he maintains they did in Western Europe (Luebbert, 1991, p. 291). This is a class-based argument. Our take is different. It was the Agrarians’ ability to attract not only Czech peasants but also a critical number of Slovak, Hungarian, and Ruthenian peasants that enabled them to outperform their Czech nationalist rivals.

Why did the nationalist–Agrarian coalition play itself out so differently in Czechoslovakia and Poland? Why did the Agrarians emerge the senior partner in former but remain the junior partner in the latter? The differences in the two cases of party strategy are probably best accounted for by organizational and imperial legacies. Although the Czech National Democrats and National Socialists restricted their organizational work by class and to cities, the harsh imperial domination of the Russian partition forced the National Democrats in Poland to set about the hard task of what they termed “organic work” among the population as a whole. The evidence from the poor agricultural region surrounding Łomża is indicative: In 1902, of the 6,800 members of one of the main precursor civic organizations to the National Democrats in all of Poland, approximately one third (2,275) were active in the Łomża region (Wolsza, 1992). In Czechoslovakia, this ground had been ceded to the Agrarians.

**Multiethnic Autocracy: Poland, 1928–1935**

Poland after the 1926 coup is conventionally classified as a traditionally authoritarian government that sought to demobilize its population (Bermeo, 2003; Luebbert, 1991). Recent research on authoritarianism, however, suggests that in modern politics even authoritarian governments look for social support (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006). Poland’s dictatorship was no different. As a former Habsburg officer who had once been a Social Democrat, Marshal Józef Piłsudski sought support not only across social classes but also across ethnic groups. The authoritarian nature of the regime after 1926, which was popularly referred to as the sanacja (meaning “cleansing” or “regenerating”), may easily divert one from appreciating the hard work that went on behind the scenes to put together a fundamentally different social coalition in support of the new disposition than the one the National Democrats had cobbled together after 1919. Traditional authoritarians in the interwar era may have hoped for the demobilization of society, but Poland demonstrates that this was not easily accomplished. In the short run, it required careful management of social interests, especially those of the ethnic majorities and minorities.
On nationality questions, the Piłsudskiites were guided by the idea of “prometheanism,” in which the melding of the country’s minorities within an overarching Polish statehood could transform Poland into a leader in Eastern Europe, simultaneously securing domestic peace while also successfully navigating the treacherous irredentism of its neighborhood (Snyder, 2005, pp. 40-48). National assimilation was to be replaced with state assimilation. In return for the state’s support for their cultural development and economic security, the minorities were to develop a sense of coresponsibility for the country’s fate and a loyal devotion to the broader Polish state project (Chojnowski, 1979, p. 24). This regime type we label multiethnic autocracy.

Measuring the nature of social coalitions is not easy in an authoritarian context. In Poland, one way of assessing the inclusion of minorities is through an analysis of the 1928 election. The election was held not primarily to choose a new government but, rather, to provide the Polish citizenry with proof that the Piłsudskiites had majority support. To secure such support the Piłsudskiites sought to unite a coalition of Poles (hived off from existing parties of differing ideological orientations) and non-Poles (who could be attracted away from ethnic parties). The vehicle for this task was the revealingly named Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (using the Polish acronym BBWR). At the communal level the BBWR’s party organizations consisted primarily of local officials and dignitaries, but a great deal of effort was made to mobilize and integrate local ethnic minorities. Notwithstanding a modicum of political repression, fraud, and a far from level playing field, the 1928 elections were remarkably free and fair considering the circumstances under which they were conducted.

Table 1 presents ecological inference estimates of ethnic group vote for various blocs of parties derived from the analysis of 1,080 municipalities and villages in Galicia, a region densely inhabited by Ukrainians and Jews. Our results suggest that BBWR efforts at integrating Poles and non-Poles into a single party were at least partially achieved, with 15% of Galician Ukrainians and 18% of Jews voting for the BBWR or its allies. The so-called progovernment parties were overwhelmingly the most important Polish party bloc among Ukrainians and Jews, but also the front-runner among Poles. Clearly at this stage a plurality of Poles preferred the rather more “tolerant” politics of the Piłsudskiites to the ethnically exclusionary politics of the Right.

The essence of integrating the minorities, however, would entail rendering them distributional beneficiaries of the new order. In this respect, the Ukrainians as the largest group were the key to the whole operation. Starting in 1929 Henryk Józewski, the governor of Volhynia, undertook an experiment to reintegrate the region’s Ukrainians and stave off the tide of communism
Table 1. Ecological Inference Estimates of Ethnic Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish Support for BBWR and Other Polish Parties Across Galicia in the 1928 National Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>Polish Left</th>
<th>BBWR and allies</th>
<th>Minority parties</th>
<th>Polish Right</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Not voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(19, 24)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(28, 37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(21, 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(13, 16)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8, 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7, 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(47, 51)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(18, 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(13, 24)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(17, 28)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1, 4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(46, 59)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(1, 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $N = 1,080$. The value in each cell represents the percentage of the national group (listed in the first column) supporting a party or group of parties; 95% confidence intervals are listed in parentheses.
and nationalism. The main components of the program were improving public administration (through including Ukrainians in all administrative structures), maintaining bilingual schools, making Ukrainian culture part of “Polish” culture, and strengthening Ukrainian churches against both Polish and Russian influence. Józewski also set up common Polish–Ukrainian economic and cultural organizations: “Spolem,” a food producing cooperative, and the “Ridna-Chata,” a cultural and pedagogical society (Schenke, 2004, pp. 243-254).

This and similar experiments in Lwów produced a modicum of change, but the resources devoted to them were too little and arrived too late. By the mid-1930s most Ukrainians were already solidly mobilized into nationalist politics and the Jewish parties had refused to support the government’s budgets in the face of continued high rates of urban taxation (Chojnowski, 1979, p. 124). It was not a complete failure, however. Piłsudski’s authoritarian reconciliation of the country’s nationalities was built on a cross-class and interethnic coalition that maintained social peace and forestalled the radicalization of politics for 6 years following the onset of the great depression, until the death of the dictator himself. Although historians have not treated Piłsudski’s regime kindly, in its own way it enjoyed a similar sort of success as Czechoslovakia in integrating the country’s minorities, a regime that began to unravel at precisely the same time as its Polish counterpart.

The key Polish players in supporting the sanacja outside of the military had been elements in the Polish community who had grown weary of the parliamentary squabbles before 1926 and feared squandering the distributional gains of the founding of the Polish state (Chojnowski, 1986, pp. 15-32). This applied especially to the conservative magnates, local state officials, and the civil service. These three groups had the resources and administrative capacity to shift their allegiance back to the founding nationalist coalition. What would be the benefit of doing so? Understanding the answer to this question in the context of Eastern Europe contains the clues to understanding what exactly fascism was in this region.

The Fascist Shift: 1935

Considering how much scholarship has been driven by the authoritarian turn throughout Europe during the 1930s, there remains remarkably little consensus on either what fascism was or the nature of its social basis (see Mann, 2004, pp. 31-92). In Eastern Europe, if democracy and traditional authoritarianism could be stabilized by a cross-ethnic coalition, fascism would require a sharp break with any such arrangements. The essence of fascism in Eastern Europe was the abandonment of all pretense of liberal restraint in favor of the ethnic
advantage of the majority group using force. This force would be applied by
civil society and, once state power had been gained, by administrative means.
Such an understanding of the social basis of fascism, in fact, puts it in line
with much recent scholarship on the subject, which stresses the importance
of interethnic redistribution and plunder (Aly, 2005).

Czechoslovakia and Poland, it is important to note, never adopted fascist
institutions, and fascist parties remained marginal in both cases. Yet both
flirted with fascist ideas and policies, and sometimes more. As Giovanni
Capoccia (2005, p. 106) notes, if the Czech and German extreme Right had
succeeded in their plans for an alliance after the stunning performance of the
Sudeten German Party in 1935 (in which it outperformed all other parties),
Czechoslovak democracy might have collapsed before 1938. State policies
ensured that this did not transpire but even beyond an alliance of the Czech
and German far Right, far more practicable would have been a renewed all-
national coalition to recapture that part of the social product redistributed to
the Germans during the years of quasi-consociational parliamentary cooperation.
It is important to note that the Czech National Democrats reemerged in 1935
together with the fascists on a common list, which together with a secondary
fascist party brought the fascist total to a nontrivial 7.6% of the vote (in a con-
test where the strongest party received 15.0%). This was the true authoritarian
potential of Czech society, and it might have been fascist indeed if not in name,
but it was one left hypothetical because of Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment.

In Poland, however, once Piłsudski’s death in 1935, those Poles who favored
rapprochement with the ethnic minorities had to confront the huge numbers of
their coethnics who had realized few gains from the regime of autocratic ethnic
incorporation (Wynot, 1974). Even though the national minorities did not con-
sider themselves to be major distributional beneficiaries of the sanacja regime,
the Polish Right certainly thought of them as such. For the conservatives and
those portions of the Polish urban middle classes who craved the stability of the
early sanacja years, the distributional benefits had already passed. The mecha-
nism by which the state regime of ethnic accommodation crumbled is inti-
mately tied to the collapse of the interethnic social coalition on which it was
built. The disintegration highlights conflict not between different classes of the
same ethnic group but between the identical classes of different ethnic groups.

Polish farmers, especially those who lived in border areas, turned against
the sanacja to protect their property rights from potential claims by Ukrainians
in the east and Germans in the west (Snyder, 2005, p. 162). But it was espe-
cially in urban areas, where the long-held National Democratic desire for
replacing the Jewish bourgeoisie and small traders with Poles remained unful-
filled, that the accommodationist order had little to offer. The same concern
applied to the professions and the universities. In fact, because they viewed themselves in direct competition with the country’s Jews, much of the country’s ethnically Polish urban bourgeoisie and aspiring middle classes had to be kept at bay for the entire accommodationist regime to work at all (Marcus, 1983, pp. 99-121). Seen this way, the ethnically accommodationist authoritarian order in Poland had much the same requirements as its democratic counterpart in Czechoslovakia. Both required sidelining the urban bourgeoisie of the majority and its most ardent parties from center stage in national politics.

After Piłsudski’s death, his successors sought renewed support among the ethnically Polish urban middle classes: The state introduced credit programs privileging ethnically Polish enterprises and engaged in a not-so-subtle program of harassing Jewish businesses through regulation and taxation (Marcus, 1983, pp. 349-366, 379-380). These state policies were more than met halfway by Polish civil society, which was willing to go beyond what the law had sanctioned, especially when no punishment was expected. During the mid to late 1930s ethnically Polish civic groups and religious institutions called for boycotts of Jewish businesses. These boycotts were frequently initiated and then enforced with public violence, pogroms, and even the bombings of synagogues, stores, and apartments (Żyndul, 1994). The tone was further reinforced by National Democratic members of the Sejm who called for outlawing Jewish butchers practicing ritual slaughter—an obvious attempt to capture a significant portion of the retail trade in meat. Ghetto benches were established at some universities, and Jewish students faced the danger of attack from right-wing students. None of these excesses were investigated or punished by the authorities despite repeated requests by Jewish Sejm deputies. Entreaties by Jewish communal organizations similarly met with no response (Tomaszewski, 2002, pp. 47-52).

The articulation of these ends and the deployment of state-sanctioned and extralegal violent means meant achieving by force in the late 1930s what could not be attained by parliamentary means during the 1920s—a once and for all redistribution of wealth from Jews to Poles. Although the regime did not describe itself as fascist and never crossed the crucial threshold of widespread paramilitary organization, it was not entirely different; the Polish variant was both inspired by fascism and in some cases guided by fascist ideology (Marcus, 1983, pp. 364-365). Successive Polish governments kept ideological fascists from power and refused to adopt their means as official state policy. We therefore deploy the otherwise awkward term fascistoid in our typology. The goal, however, continued to be interethnic redistribution from one middle class to another; the costs associated with a certain amount of domestic disorder and international criticism were deemed to be outweighed by the immediate distributional benefits. Not all Poles shared these goals or approved
of the means but enough did, and many of the very same state officials, con-
servative magnates, and civil servants who had supported the sanacja regime
of accommodation now bowed to pressure from the more radical (but mostly
bourgeois) elements in the Sejm and Polish society to tolerate social violence
(Tomaszewski, 2002, p. 50). Whatever collective action problems had
divided the urban and rural Polish Right in the 1920s were overcome by the
material benefits of a new round of exclusion. The result was the social coaliti-
tion that supported the more radically exclusionist, fascistoid regime of the
late 1930s.

Seen this way, fascistoid government in Eastern Europe was less about
integrating the working class or about the countryside responding to a red
scare, as Luebbert (1991) maintains, than it was a prospect for one more round
of interethnic redistribution, this time “with the gloves off.” This reflected the
clearly ethnic, as opposed to class, basis on which it was built. The prospect of
new resources and opportunities for the majority group, especially when con-
fronting a minority that seemed to control a disproportionate share of national
wealth, brought together the violence and hierarchy of the Right with the egal-
itarian redistributionist streak of the Left. This pattern is consistent across
interwar Eastern Europe and probably accounts for the strange coalition of
supporters in cases such as Hungary and Romania, where full-fledged fascist
parties gained significant electoral support from a disparate set of urban and

Conclusion

This article illustrates in the context of interwar Eastern Europe a general
point made by Capoccia and Ziblatt (IN PRESS) in the introduction to this col-
lection, namely that a great deal can still be learned about macro-level political
outcomes by examining the micro-level details of key political turning points.
Our analysis of reform episodes in multiethnic interwar Czechoslovakia and
Poland has shown that the fundamental dilemma these countries faced was how
to include substantial minority populations in mass politics while at the same
time limiting their influence over public policy. The most divisive and bitter
competition for political primacy in these states thus took place not between
social classes or income groups regardless of nationality but within social
classes between different nationalities. Interwar Czechoslovak and Polish
politics was far more about ethnic majorities seeking to reap the rewards of
“owning” the state at the expense of minorities than about class conflict.

This feature of Eastern politics, we argue, has two big implications. First, it
calls into question standard models of democratization for Western Europe,
which privilege “modern” actors such as workers and farmers over distinctly
“premodern” ones such as ethnic groups. Contra the standard model and the conventional historical wisdom, democratic success in Czechoslovakia and failure in Poland cannot be attributed to a strong bourgeoisie in the former and a weak one in the latter. Ironically, quite the opposite is true. In Czechoslovakia, a highly industrialized “Western” country, the Agrarians dominated their coalition with the bourgeois National Democrats. Tellingly, however, the Agrarians owed their success in large part to their appeal to minority voters, an option less available to their more nationalist coalition partners. In largely rural Poland, by contrast, the mostly urban and middle-class National Democrats, who predominated in their alliance with Polish Agrarian parties, cast themselves as the epitome of bourgeois virtue. Yet their chauvinist attitude toward minority groups precluded an ethnic accommodation that might have stabilized the democratic regime. In the end that accommodation was achieved only with Piłsudski’s 1926 coup d’état.

The second implication of the national cleavage concerns the nature of regime types in Eastern Europe. In conventional accounts of democratization, liberal, social democratic, and fascist regimes in interwar Western Europe represented different solutions to the destabilizing effects of surging working-class power. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, where restive ethnic minorities posed the primary threat, a different set of regimes emerged, ones that go beyond the familiar choice between dictatorship and democracy. Both countries began the interwar period with ethnic democracy, which permitted a one-time procedurally democratic transfer of wealth from minority to majority through policies consolidating majority control of the state and economy. However, once these gains had been pocketed, this regime type proved unstable because the parties representing majority groups began to quarrel among themselves. This led to legislative gridlock and the crises of 1925-1926.

In Czechoslovakia the Agrarians solved this problem by bringing German parties of both the Left and the Right into government. This was quasi-consociationalism, which gave minorities a greater say in public policy than their demographic weight would otherwise accord them, but on an informal rather than formal basis. In Poland, where the National Democrats were unwilling to conclude a similar agreement with the minorities, Piłsudski initiated what we call multiethnic autocracy, an authoritarian twin of quasi-consociationalism in which the dictatorial state rather than informal agreements among leading democratic elites guides cooperation between majority and minority groups. In both countries, however, the new regimes were backed by cross-ethnic (and cross-class) social and political coalitions that sought to become the distributional beneficiaries of the new order. The fascistoid regime in late 1930s Poland marked a return to the goals of ethnic democracy but with radically antiliberal means.

On a final note, our findings, which emerged only through a focus on the actual political processes at work during the key reform episode of 1925-1926,
suggest a more general hypothesis. Sustaining democracy in multiethnic states may in fact require sidelining the “titular” urban bourgeoisie, both haute and petite, from a dominant role in political life, something that the Czech Agrarians succeeded in doing but the Poles could not except by abolishing democracy altogether. The failure of structural theories of democratization in an even so demonstrably “Western” country as Czechoslovakia suggests that students of Western European democratization may profit by reconsidering their accounts and including actors other than the “usual suspects” of workers and peasants, business and labor, and rich and poor. In fact, this strategy, advocated by Capoccia and Ziblatt (IN PRESS), proves fruitful in the accounts of key turning points toward democratization in Western European states included in this volume. Moreover, such a turn would open up cross-regional comparisons, leading to new insights into the determinants of regime type not only within Europe of earlier eras but also in the deeply divided societies of the contemporary Global South.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Sheri Berman, Michael Bernhard, Giovanni Capoccia, James Caporaso, Ruth Berins Collier, David Collier, Andrew Gould, Juliet Johnson, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Daniel Ziblatt for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Victor Gomez, Cathy Mah, and Kimberly Twist provided valuable research assistance.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Financial Disclosure/Funding

The authors received the following financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article: The authors acknowledge the generous support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0217499), the National Council for East European and Eurasian Research, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Notes

1. We compensate in our analysis for these quite distinct imperial legacies by focusing in the Polish case on Galicia, a formerly Habsburg territory.
2. The Czechoslovak National Socialists were not Nazis but typical ethnic democrats.
3. Even the Slovak autonomists participated in the all-national coalition because, as one of the two titular nations, they benefitted from the transfer of state power from Hungarians to Slovaks.
4. Wiskemann’s contemporary reportage states,

I have never heard the more serious Sudeten Germans, however anti-Czech they may be, deny that the German tenants working on expropriated land were quite justly treated in being allowed to become its owners. “The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner.” . . . German foresters . . . have been changed from serfs into men only by the land reform carried through by the Republic. (Wiskemann, 1938/1967, p. 152)

5. Negotiations with the minorities are retold in the diary of Piłsudski’s head of the political department in the Ministry of Military Affairs, Kazimierz Świtalski (Świtalski, 1992).

6. In Volhynia, for example, Ukrainians and Jews were included on the BBWR list, and rabbis widely instructed their congregants to vote for the BBWR (see Snyder, 2005, pp. 64-67).

7. A sure sign of this is that the BBWR did not succeed in garnering a majority.

8. In central and eastern Poland, where administrative pressure was more severe, 17% of Orthodox Belarusians and Ukrainians and 25% of Jews are estimated to have supported the BBWR.

9. Violence against Jews appeared to reach a zenith from 1935 to 1937 but continued until the German invasion. See Polish police reports by voivodship in March, April, and May 1939 in Archiwum Akt Nowych, KG PP Wydział IV Referat Kryminalny. Miesieczne wykazy przestępczości według województw, 1222, 1224, 1226 (dopływ).

References


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