

**Across the Generations: The Influences on Vietnamese American Partisanship**

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**Abstract**

Asian-American partisanship is nuanced, with each different Asian group having different relationships and histories with the United States. One such group is the Vietnamese-American population. Largely believed to be conservative voters, current studies provide a wide array of possibilities as to what influences them to identify as conservatives. Possible explanations range from community influences to economic ones. I investigate the differences between how different generations of Vietnamese-Americans obtain partisanship, examining different social influences such as community, media consumption, and familial connections. Findings indicate that friends and community play a large role in partisanship acquisition for all generations, but the younger generations have more recently been influenced by social media.

## Introduction

The United States has a complex history with the Vietnamese, stemming from its involvement in the Vietnam War. As a result of its involvement and the following migration crisis, the United States now hosts the largest Vietnamese population outside of Vietnam, totaling around 2.2 million people as of 2019. And they have become the fourth-largest Asian group in the US.<sup>1</sup> As Vietnamese refugees migrated into the United States, they concentrated into specific areas, such as Little Saigon in Orange County, California and Harris County, Texas, meaning they have immense influence in local and district elections.<sup>2</sup>

Current voting data suggests an overwhelming preference for the Republican party when compared to other Asian-American groups, as almost half of Vietnamese-Americans are registered Republicans.<sup>3</sup> Their arrival to the United States was also met with intense anti-communist messaging from Republicans, prompting a compelling interest to align with the Republican party.<sup>4</sup> Further confirmation of a predisposition to the Republican party came during the Capitol Riots in Congressional Chambers on January 6th, when Vietnamese-Americans rioters flew the defunct flag of South Vietnam, a significant symbol for Vietnamese Americans, on the Capitol steps.<sup>5</sup> This data and the flag's presence on January 6th inspired this study. I

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<sup>1</sup> Abby Budiman, "Vietnamese in the U.S. Fact Sheet," Published April 29, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/fact-sheet/asian-americans-vietnamese-in-the-u-s-fact-sheet/>; Laura Harjanto and Jeanne Batalova, "Vietnamese Immigrants in the United States," Published October 15, 2021, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/vietnamese-immigrants-united-states>.

<sup>2</sup> Harjanto and Batalova, "Vietnamese Immigrants in the United States."

<sup>3</sup> Dhrumil Mehta, "How Asian Americans Are Thinking About The 2020 Election," *FiveThirtyEight*, September 18, 2020,

<https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-asian-americans-are-thinking-about-the-2020-election/>.  
<sup>4</sup> Loan Kieu Le and Phi Hong Su, "Party identification and the immigrant cohort hypothesis: the case of Vietnamese Americans," *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 6, no. 4 (2018): 743-763, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2017.1289849>

<sup>5</sup> Claire Wang, "Why the defunct South Vietnam flag was flown at the Capitol riot," Published January 15, 2021,

realized that I did not understand my community that well and wanted to know what would compel its members to participate in such an act. From my own understanding of my community, I expected the exact opposite from the Vietnamese-American community.

Most of the current theories apply to Asian-Americans as a whole but the studies that focus on Vietnamese-Americans specifically list numerous potential influences on Vietnamese-American partisanship. This study aims to test if theories regarding Asian-Americans can apply to Vietnamese-Americans and refine theories on Vietnamese-American partisanship. An additional attempt made by the study will be to study how partisanship develops across different generations of Vietnamese-Americans.

With this study, I expect younger Vietnamese-Americans to vote more liberally than their older counterparts, with different social influences such as media consumption or historical contexts to contribute to the difference in partisanship. Relying on existing voting data, I expected older Vietnamese-Americans to largely be conservative voters, possibly influenced by conservative values in their home country of Vietnam. To investigate this, I relied on existing literature focusing on Asian American and Vietnamese-American partisanship and compared it to a study sent out to the local Vietnamese population in Orange County, California. This study received a mostly politically moderate and liberal sample. It found that the largest influences on Vietnamese-American partisanship were friends and community, but the younger generations had the additional influence of social media. It also found a surprising amount of self-identifying independents, who identify as such due to their lack of faith in politics and politicians.

### **Literature Review/Historiography**

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<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/why-defunct-south-vietnam-flag-was-flown-capitol-riots-n1254306>

Similar to this project, scholars were interested in learning about the fast growing Asian population in the United States and what effects their political decisions. Current literature goes into great detail on the influences of Asian American partisanship, with numerous theories presented for why Asian Americans may lean towards either side of the political spectrum. Although these studies cover Asian Americans as an aggregate and do not focus on Vietnamese Americans, they offer a foundation for which this study will test and compare to data on Vietnamese Americans.

Cane, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner suggest that there is a positive, linear relationship between the duration that Asian Americans reside in the United States with their likelihood of being right-leaning, compared to their Latino counterparts who become more left-leaning.<sup>6</sup> What they found was exposure to American politics tends to push Asian Americans towards the Republican Party more so than other influences. The authors posit that experiences with communist regimes in their home countries generate anti-communist sentiment in Asian Americans, which would explain why Asian Americans align with the Republican Party at a higher rate than Latinos since Republicans at this time took a hard stance against communism. Those that maintained ties to their home countries, specifically Chinese, Korean, and Southeast Asians, would be more influenced by foreign policy efforts when aligning with a party. What Cane, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner demonstrate then is that experiences with communism and exposure to politics push certain Asian groups to the Republican Party. Further explorations into exposure to politics as a significant influence have diminished its established effectiveness. More recent scholarship has suggested that it is not necessarily exposure to politics that would influence partisanship, but those with greater interests in politics and the belief that they could influence government were

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<sup>6</sup> Bruce E. Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole J. Uhlaner, “The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans,” *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 2 (May 1991): 390-422. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111368>.

more likely to be partisan.<sup>7</sup> While current research limited this theory, recent events from the pandemic, with regard to the Stop Asian Hate movement, may change the validity of this theory.

Academics regard experiences with discrimination as a liberalizing factor and believe that Asian Americans are thus more likely to align with the Democratic Party.<sup>8</sup> Social identity theory is key in understanding this trend. Discrimination tends to increase one's awareness of their social identity, a minority in an ethnic group, and link their exclusion to their ethnic group's exclusion from society. Research shows that Asians, despite being viewed favorably via the model minority view, still face a large amount of barriers in American society.<sup>9</sup> This fact, paired with events in recent decades, makes Asians more likely to align with the Democratic Party and create disdain for the Republican Party. The same holds true with Asians who immigrated to the United States after experiencing social exclusions within their origin countries.<sup>10</sup> One notable limitation in these studies is that they group Asian Americans together as a whole rather than taking into account the individual experiences of the subgroups, something Lim points out in their study. For instance, despite the study's claim that Asians are more likely to align with the left, almost half of Vietnamese Americans align with the Republican Party, which is unique to the Asian groups.<sup>11</sup> This is due to the unique contexts of their arrival in the United States where

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<sup>7</sup> Ngoc Phan and John A. Garcia, "Asian-Pacific-American Partisanship: Dynamics of Partisan and Nonpartisan Identities," *Social Science Quarterly* 90, no. 4 (December 2009): 886-910. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42940646>.

<sup>8</sup> Alexander Kuo, Neil Malhotra and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, "Social Exclusion and Political Identity: The Case of Asian American Partisanship," *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 1 (January 2017): 17-32. <https://doi.org/10.1086/687570>; P. See Lim, Colleen Barry-Goodman, and David Branham. "Discrimination that Travels: How Ethnicity Affects Party Identification for Southeast Asian Immigrants." *Social Science Quarterly* 87, no. 5 (December 2006): 1158-1170. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42956600>

<sup>9</sup> Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo, "Social Exclusion and Political Identity," 21.

<sup>10</sup> Lim, Barry-Goodman, and Branham, "Discrimination that Travels," 1168.

<sup>11</sup> Dhruvil Mehta, "How Asian Americans Are Thinking About The 2020 Election,"

*FiveThirtyEight*, September 18, 2020,

<https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-asian-americans-are-thinking-about-the-2020-election/>

they were met with harsh anti-communist rhetoric.<sup>12</sup> Although there is a sharp contrast between the theory that the paper presents and what subgroups actually face, it provides an opportunity for exploration into why the theory does not apply to Vietnamese Americans and test if history is the only underlying cause.

Scholars have also attributed various social factors as a liberalizing influence for Asian Americans. Raychaudhuri finds that Asian American immigrants tend to be introduced to American politics through fellow immigrants and have mixed partisan beliefs, where they hold conservative ideology but vote Democrat because the “Republicans [are] too ideologically extreme.”<sup>13</sup> Their children, the second-generation and so forth, tend to hold more liberal beliefs and a stronger conviction for the Democratic Party. While researchers initially thought that family influence would create a change like this, they actually found that immigrants and their children do not talk about politics often, if at all. Rather, their children’s views are influenced by school and their peers. Second-generation Asian Americans and so forth have more educational opportunities than their parents did and experienced more liberal ideologies in American colleges, which makes them more likely to align with the Democratic Party.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, while not an influence itself, researchers found that Asian Americans that have Black friends were 12% more likely to identify with the Democratic Party, whereas having a White or Latino friend did not create a difference.<sup>15</sup> Raychaudhuri proposes that an effect similar to the social exclusion and minority awareness effect in Lim’s study may be driving this push.

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<sup>12</sup> Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner, “The Acquisition of Partisanship,” 396.

<sup>13</sup> Raychaudhuri, Tanika. “The social roots of Asian American partisan attitudes.” *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 6, no. 3 (2018): 389-410. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2018.1494009>

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.; Kayee Zhou and Dennis Patterson, "Changing patterns of Asian-American partisanship: Accounting for the politicization of the U.S.'s fastest growing minority," *Social Science Quarterly* 102, no. 4 (July 2021): 1428-1438. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13050>

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

A limitation with all of the current literature is how Asian Americans are grouped together in partisanship analysis. In their work, Zhou notes that “factors driving change in Asian-American partisanship are unique to members of this large and diverse group.”<sup>16</sup> Zhou’s survey data already shows a discrepancy in current research into Asian American partisanship and its applications to the Vietnamese American community. While Asian Americans as a whole are more likely to align with the Democratic Party and hold liberal ideals, the odds for Vietnamese Americans identifying as Democratic are “70 percent lower than the odds for non-Vietnamese.”<sup>17</sup> Vietnamese Americans have a unique history with the United States political system that could drastically alter their partisanship. Vietnamese Americans arrived to the United States by various means, with boats and immigration programs such as the Orderly Departure Program being the most well-known and utilized. The discrepancy and unique history warrants a deeper analysis into the Vietnamese American community and why they constantly identify with the Republican Party.

While limited, current research on Vietnamese American partisanship utilizes their complicated history and analyzes their partisanship by immigration cohort/wave. The crisis surrounding Vietnamese American migration lasted for several decades, but Le and Su split the immigrants into three distinct waves: the social elite from 1975-1979, the group immigrating under the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) from 1980-1994, and those that migrated after the ODP ended in 1995. Waves 1 and 2 witnessed staunch anticommunist rhetoric from the Republican Party, although it was not until Wave 2 that the Republican Party began outreach to these immigrants.<sup>18</sup> The outreach efforts changed by 1994, when the Republican Party advocated

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<sup>16</sup> Zhou and Patterson, “Changing Patterns,” 1437.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Le and Su, “Party identification and the immigrant cohort hypothesis: the case of Vietnamese Americans,” 749.



for stricter immigration reform and access to the Democratic Party improved.<sup>19</sup> Throughout the time between 1995 and 2008, Democrats became more involved in civil protests within the Vietnamese community and began to take part in cultural festivals and advocacy work.<sup>20</sup> Wave 3 reported an 8 percent increase in Democratic identification than the other waves, possibly due to the increased access to the Democratic Party and the Party's work to help the community.<sup>21</sup> Le and Su present a thorough in-depth look into the community that proves useful to this study. It provides the author a chance for a deeper analysis of how the group's reception after immigration works with other social variables to create a partisan identity.

### **Research Design**

Following other studies into Asian American partisanship, this project aims to examine partisanship acquisition via a survey and in-depth interviews with selected respondents. The survey is a means to determine a pattern in partisanship acquisition while taking into account numerous different variables. It takes into account different age groups ranging from 18-21 to 61-70, gender, education, generational status, and social influences. With regards to social influences, this survey takes into account media consumption, familial interaction, and current events. The study was distributed among local and familiar networks with data stored anonymously. Respondents were given the opportunity to opt-in for the interview. This project's survey received 28 responses, with a wide range of respondents from different backgrounds and age groups. Immigrants and first-generation Vietnamese Americans made up the majority of respondents, with only 5 second-generation respondents. The survey accepted responses starting in the beginning of March until mid-April. Each response took on average 7-10 minutes to complete, and two respondents took half an hour to an hour to complete the survey. Interviews

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 750-751.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

were held with 6 respondents across all age groups to gain a better insight into their responses. The interviews took place from late April to early May. The responses corroborate predictions regarding one's generational status and political alignments but make drastic departures from other predictions.

## **Results**

Current trends in the larger Asian American diaspora suggest that younger Asian Americans are more likely to hold liberal ideology and align with the Democratic party than their older counterparts, due to a number of factors.

Regarding party affiliation, only 14 respondents claimed themselves as Democrats while 10 others were Democratic-leaning Independents, 1 was Republican, and 2 were true Independents. Surprisingly, the vast majority of Independent respondents were from younger age groups between the ages of 18-21 or 22-30. Those that held stronger ties to the Democratic Party were from the older age groups that responded to the survey, with a few from the younger cohorts.

The data for ideology also provided interesting results. There were no distinct differences in ideology between the surveyed age groups, with 15 respondents identifying as Liberal/Very Liberal, 10 respondents identifying as Moderate, 2 identifying as Moderate with a Liberal bias, and 1 respondent identifying as Conservative. The Liberal and Moderate identifications were spread out consistently amongst the different age groups with no group containing a significant fraction of either identity over the other. The single Conservative respondent came from the 18-21 age group.

Respondents gauged their interest in politics and indicated whether or not they voted in the most recent elections. There was a large disparity in interest in politics and voting when comparing different age groups. Respondents between the ages of 31-70 had the most interest in politics, with both very and somewhat interested in politics responses achieving 40% of the age group each. Respondents 22-30 expressed less interest, with 53% of the group saying that they were somewhat interested in politics, 23% expressing strong interest, and 23% expressing no interest. Those that are 18-21 have the least interest in politics, with only 20% of the group expressing some interest and the rest expressing no interest at all in politics.

The sources that they rely on for political information also showed different trends across age groups. Television, radio, and news websites were the majority for sources of political information in each age group. However, the survey indicates that younger groups adopted social media as a source of political information, in some cases as the only source of political information. Social media was a source of political information for all respondents aged 18-21, 62% of respondents aged 22-30, and 20% of respondents aged 31-70. The 20% in the last group is from one respondent that is between 31-40 years old.

## **Discussion**

Scholarship suggests that Asian Americans are more likely to become right-leaning the more that they stay in the United States, particularly those that lived under a communist regime in their countries of origin.<sup>22</sup> With particular regard to Vietnamese Americans, this theory could be true. Many Vietnamese migrants arrived to the United States after living in refugee camps spread throughout Southeast Asia, which they entered after fleeing from the Communist government in Vietnam. Their susceptibility to Republican anti-communist messaging is certainly high and anti-communism is strong within Vietnamese communities. As recent as 1999, there was a fierce

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<sup>22</sup> Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner, "The Acquisition of Partisanship," 396.

protest against the display of Vietnam's flag and Ho Chi Minh's photo in a store in Little Saigon.<sup>23</sup>

Despite this, most respondents reported voting for Democratic candidates and aligned with liberal or moderate ideologies. There are numerous factors that could help explain the difference. For instance, Cane, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner found that in San Francisco, young Asian American political activists believed the older generations' anti-communist attitudes were irrelevant for forming their beliefs.<sup>24</sup> This, however, does not fully explain the results, especially for the older generations that have lived in the United States for years but still vote Democratic.

Peer or familial interactions could further explain why most respondents voted Democrat or hold liberal or moderate ideology. Respondents were asked to mark which activities they had participated in over the past few years and to gauge their personal network's ideology. Most respondents discussed politics with family and friends over the past few years, but they tend to hold views contrary to what their family members hold. Whereas a respondent's parents were conservative, they were either moderate or liberal and this trend was seen with all responses. It suggests that family had little to no effect on their political leanings, as suggested by Raychaudhuri.<sup>25</sup>

Rather, most of the respondents' political leanings closely resembled their friends and community's leanings. Respondents that were liberal lived in either liberal or moderate communities and moderates lived in generally liberal communities, all despite the fact that their families are heavily conservative. This data suggests that friends and community may play a larger role in shaping partisan identities for Vietnamese Americans. It is also possible that the

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<sup>23</sup> "Poster Protest in Little Saigon," *CBS News*, February 11, 1999, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poster-protest-in-little-saigon/>.

<sup>24</sup> Cane, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner, "The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans," 406.

<sup>25</sup> Raychaudhuri, "The social roots of Asian American partisan attitudes," 389-410.

differences could be attributed to their own understanding of what liberal, moderate, and conservative all mean.

Insight into media consumption provided meaningful insight into the relationship between the type of media consumed and partisanship. Most of the moderate respondents were in the 22-30 age group and used social media as a source of political information at a rate lower than those that were 18-21 years old. Responses with social media listed as a source were more likely to self-identify as liberal or strong liberal and Democrat and Strong Democrat than those without social media as a source. While participation in social movements such as Black Lives Matter and Stop Asian Hate was virtually nonexistent in responses, those that marked social media as a resource were the only ones to participate in the movements. It corroborates the finding that Liberal Democrats are more likely to use social media to “mobilize others or find like-minded groups.”<sup>26</sup> An estimated 44% of liberals used it to “encourage others to take action on an issue that was important to them.”<sup>27</sup> It does not mean, however, that social media is a liberalizing factor. Rather, similar to how schools function, it creates a social circle of individuals with similar interests and beliefs, which has an established effect on partisanship.<sup>28</sup> It could simply be the case that the liberal respondents to the survey developed liberal ideology due to interactions with like-minded peers on social media and the same would be true for conservatives. This concept is called an “echo chamber,” and different algorithms created by social media companies have led to different experiences with echo chambers on their sites.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Monica Anderson and JingJing Jiang, “Liberal Democrats more likely than other groups to be politically active on social media,” *Pew Research Center*, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2018/11/05/liberal-democrats-more-likely-than-other-groups-to-be-politically-active-on-social-media/>.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Raychaudhuri, “The social roots of Asian American partisan attitudes,” 406.

<sup>29</sup> Matteo Cinelli et al., “The echo chamber effect on social media,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 118, no. 9 (January 2021), <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2023301118>

When comparing sites with algorithms that allowed users to change their content, like Reddit, or sites that did not provide that option, like Facebook, the latter tends to produce more homophilic groups.<sup>30</sup> Another study found that individuals may have a small role in what ideological content they see, as certain clicks may lead an algorithm to load less content that conflicts with their ideological views.<sup>31</sup> Social media algorithms' impacts on ideology formation still require further study but have strong backing for this potential effect.

Previous studies claim a push to the Democratic Party among younger generations of Asian Americans, whether it is via experiences with discrimination, peers, or education, but 43% of respondents viewed themselves as Independent with the highest concentration in the 18-21 age group.<sup>32</sup> They all share common experiences that would make them more likely to identify with the Democratic Party, specifically attending college and experiencing racist comments.

In discussions with some respondents, they reported that they did not believe either party best represented their beliefs entirely and that they were not interested in politics at all because of the behavior of political representatives. Their reasons for their votes in the most recent presidential elections were to prevent what they perceived as a more unappealing candidate from assuming office. One respondent indicated that they did not like either candidate but voted based on which candidate was less divisive and which one their community supported more. Another respondent indicated that they voted third party because that specific candidate reflected their values better while the candidates from the dominant parties had generally undesirable traits, including wealth, self-perception, presentation, and age.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing, and Lada A. Adamic, "Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook," *Science* 348, no. 6239 (May 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160>

<sup>32</sup> Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo, "Social Exclusion and Political Identity," 21; Raychaudhuri, "The social roots," 406; Zhou and Patterson, "Changing patters," 1437.

Refusal to identify with either party is part of a larger growing trend among young voters in the United States to register Independent. Tufts reported in 2018 that only 56% of young voters registered with either the Democratic party or the Republican party and Axios confirmed the same levels in 2022.<sup>33</sup> Given that the Independent identity only increases in younger age groups in the survey, it seems that younger Vietnamese-Americans are following the larger trend of younger voters registering as Independent.

The older survey respondents were all committed to the Democratic Party, contrary to initial expectations from Le and Su. Many were part of waves one and two and more likely to align with the Republican party since the party ran extensive outreach campaigns with anti-communist rhetoric at this time.<sup>34</sup>

There are a few reasons that could have pushed them to identify as Democrats. The older respondents reported experiencing acts of racism or gender discrimination when they migrated to the United States, which tends to be a liberalizing factor.<sup>35</sup> They also noted civic duty and American pride as their reasons for political participation and their affiliations. In one discussion with a respondent, they noted that they did not feel as if the Republican party represented what America should be. They drew on their experiences from Vietnam and drew parallels to today's political climate, comparing the Republican party to the Vietnamese Communists that they fled from. Parallels included inflammatory rhetoric and racially-charged exclusionary practices, similar to the ones this respondent faced as an Amerasian in Vietnam. They explained," America

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<sup>33</sup> "Young People's Ambivalent Relationship with Political Parties," *Center for Information and Research and Civic Learning and Engagement*, published October 24, 2018, <https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/young-peoples-ambivalent-relationship-political-parties>; Stef W. Knight, "Younger voters declare independence," *Axios*, published January 15, 2023, <https://www.axios.com/2023/01/15/voters-declare-independence-political-parties>.

<sup>34</sup> Le and Su, "Party identification,"

<sup>35</sup> Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo, "Social Exclusion and Political Identity," 17-32; Lim, Barry-Goodman, and Branham, "Discrimination that travels," 1158-1170.

is for everybody.” Though, this is a departure from what current voter registration tells us. It could simply be differences in political understanding that drives this particular group to register as Democrats when the rest of their peers are registered Republicans. What is more likely is the anti-communist messaging and aggressive outreach from Republicans when they first migrated to the United States.

### **Conclusion**

The results of this study provide significant insight on the influences of Vietnamese-American partisanship across generational lines, as well as a group as a whole. In a large contradiction to voter registration data and initial expectations, the sampled group mostly identified as Democrat and Independent, and Liberal and Moderate. Survey data and follow-up conversations revealed that the reasons for this trend differed depending on age group.

While older immigrants were motivated by a sense of civic duty and their experiences with discrimination in Vietnam, younger respondents were influenced by their friends and increasing social media usage. In this case, social media’s echo chamber effect created online groups and personalized feeds tailored to match this group’s existing ideology.

The data also revealed that a respondent’s family had no bearing on their belief system, confirming previous scholarly work in partisanship acquisition. The large portion of respondents that identified as Independent did so because they believed that neither party fully represented their interests. Their votes were based on which candidate was less unappealing and more suited for office, rather than believing in their platform.

This study does not definitively conclude what exactly influences Vietnamese-American partisanship, but provides possible areas for further study in order to gain a more complete understanding of Vietnamese-American partisanship. For instance, further study into how the



older generation's experience with the Vietnam War shaped their ideological formation could emphasize how traumatic experiences influence partisanship. However, any study into this area should be done urgently, as the immigrant population from the war era is aging.

Social media as an influence on partisanship was not expected as a part of the study, but provided an important insight as to how younger generations could be politically mobilized to participate in political movements and shape their identities and beliefs. The echo chamber effect's presence in only younger generations in this paper warrants further study. This study also utilized subjects from the local area around the University of California, Irvine and Orange County, which could impact why the sample was overwhelmingly liberal compared to what voter data dictates should be represented in this sample. Future research could investigate whether or not this group is becoming more liberal over their time in the United States, seeing as the current data departs drastically from recent voting data. Understanding the nuances of this group's leanings would expand on our current understanding of the migrant population's views of the US political process and how different factors could shape another migrant group's partisanship.

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