

The Puzzle of UN Security Council Intervention: Artsakh Conflict Revisited

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14 June 2024

Abstract:

This study dives into the intricacies of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council's (UNSC) intervention in the long-lasting conflict over the disputed territory of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), particularly focusing on the deployment of UN observer missions. Drawing on insights from various international relations theories and historical contexts, the research seeks to answer the question of why the UNSC chose to intervene in 2023 following a violence spike and refugee crises but refrained from similar actions during the comparable period of unrest back in 2020. By analyzing existing literature and official UN documents, the study sheds light on the complex dynamics of the UN decision-making process specifically in the puzzling case of the UN response to Artsakh, while emphasizing the role of national interests among the states on the council during both periods. This analysis is crucial for understanding the influencing factors of the UN response to conflicts in disputed territories. Ultimately, the study underlines the need for an understanding of the UN intervention strategies and their implications for international peace and security.

I. Introduction

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, a Polish-American diplomat and political scientist, once stated "Because you can't intervene everywhere, you don't conclude you can't intervene anywhere" ("Top 70 Zbigniew" 2024). Throughout the years, conflict and humanitarian crises have haunted various nations across the globe, while testing the core of many international institutions and challenging the main foundations of sovereignty and collective security. Amidst

those institutions is the United Nations - the sole institution responsible for authorizing the use of force. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) emerged as a beacon of hope but also has borne the responsibility of supporting the preservation of peace and stability on a global scale. This responsibility has prompted much scholarly debate over the question of when and how the UNSC should intervene in the affairs of sovereign states (Hardt 2014, Johnson 2023, Sonnback 2020, Johnstone 2022).

However, existing research has yet to explain the UN's decision to intervene with a particular UN observer mission in 2023 - despite a similar spike in violence in 2020 and why the UN sent in an observer mission after such a spike in 2023. In the case of this decades-long conflict over the disputed territory of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) following the Armenian genocide in 1915, there were numerous spikes in violence resulting in a refugee crisis and mass emigration (Cheterian 2018) but there was no intervention. Understanding these dynamics is crucial in explaining why the UN chose to intervene at a specific time and not earlier. Therefore, in this study, I will answer the following question, *“Why did the United Nations take action by sending observers to the Artsakh conflict after ethnic Armenians fled the region, yet chose not to do so earlier in the long-standing conflict at a time of similar levels of violence?”* With the case of Artsakh not being as known in the international community, this argument may be introducing new factors that people have not considered or even known before. I seek to introduce a new argument to a long-lasting research question of why international security organizations engage in peace operations in some cases of small countries with low strategic value for the P5 but refrain from interventions in other cases of small countries experiencing humanitarian crises, even when there are documented war crimes (AMNESTY International 2020, 2022). I argue that the reason that the UN sent observer missions to Artsakh in 2023 and not in 2020 despite the

violence spikes being similar lies in the differences in national interests between those states that were on the UNSC relative to those that were not. In the case of the decades-long conflict in Artsakh, the region has had low political and strategic value for leading P5 countries; consequently, the 44-day war of Artsakh has stayed in the shadows of the world, not receiving any attention or help from the United Nations Security Council and instead experiencing a humanitarian disaster.

II. UN Security Council Decision Making on Conflict in Disputed Territories

UN Responses to Disputed Territories

Throughout the years, protecting human rights especially in the Middle East and around that area has become an important yet sensitive topic for many people given the long history of colonialism and military interventions. With this protection arises the different types of possible interventions that the UN could do, whether through classical peacekeeping operations, whether through military intervention or observer missions, or other types of responses like sanctions, diplomatic negotiations, monitoring and reporting mechanisms (Bellamy and Dunne 2016). “Classical peacekeeping operations” refers to the deployment of people whether through military or observer missions who are positioned to maintain the peace in the region (Weiss and Daws 2018). Observer missions differ from military peace operations (also known as peace enforcement operations) since observer missions involve the deployment of civilian personnel and are unarmed, with the main mission focusing on monitoring and reporting while also possibly helping the region build confidence (Degan 2007). Furthermore, with the creation of the United Nations, and more specifically the establishment of the UN Security Council (UNSC), expectations arose for the protection of weaker states and populations through interventions designed to defend against stronger, more aggressive entities, especially those violating

humanitarian law and committing war crimes (UN n.d., Hanhimäki 2008). Among the many types of conflicts, territorial disputes are some of the most protracted and challenging to resolve. Disputed territories often serve as flashpoints for conflict, highlighting the need for international cooperation and the involvement of organizations like the UN to foster peaceful resolutions. Some of these territories that have been the focus of intense international attention include Kashmir, the West Bank, and Crimea, where prolonged disputes have necessitated ongoing diplomatic efforts and peacekeeping missions (The World Factbook Archive 2020). These examples, along with the case of Cyprus and its decades-old UN peace operation, where there remains a decades-long UN peace operation, I am adding an example which supports the claim and underscores the critical role of the UN and its Security Council in addressing complex geopolitical issues and striving for stability and justice in some of the world's most volatile regions.

Even though the UN with the involvement of the Security Council has been active in many peacekeeping operations throughout the world, there remain some puzzling cases like the case of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) which lies the unexpected nature of external involvement despite ongoing human rights violations and the potential for escalating conflict. Despite anticipation of significant intervention due to the involvement of regional powers and recent escalations, such as the 44-day war in 2020 and the threat of full-scale war in 2023, the actual level and nature of intervention differed from expectations when comparing the two cases. The UN Security Council did not opt to intervene in the form of peace enforcement but did - in the latter case - opt for an observer mission in 2023. The puzzle of why the UN intervened in the case of Artsakh in the way that it did in 2023 remains the fact that despite various human rights violations throughout the years, the degree of external involvement was anticipated due to the

involvement of regional powers (e.g. Russia and Turkey) the actual intervention was less extensive and rather different than expected. Alternatively, the surprise of the late response of the UNSC was that despite initial expectations of limited intervention, external powers played a more significant role than anticipated, influencing the course of the conflict in unforeseen ways.

Decision-making on UN Interventions

The importance of acknowledging this international security phenomenon is to dive more into depth as to why the UN Security Council tends to support intervention in some issues yet remains inactive in others and also might help scholars of security studies, and particularly scholars of peacekeeping, understand the reasons behind this particular political decision to engage in this specific-type of peace operation. This body's main role is to maintain international peace and security. The overall decision-making process is simple yet complicated as the UNSC has 15 members of which five are permanent members (France, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom and China) and the other 10 are non-permanent. One of the many items on the agenda of the council is to bring up peaceful resolutions to a possible conflict or threat and try to resolve the issue as efficiently as possible whether through possible sanctions or even authorizing in some cases the use of force (United Nations n.d.). Explaining why the UN intervenes with *observer missions*, in particular, is critical for international security scholars to understand UN decision-making on interventions better, particularly because these missions are largely overlooked in the existing literature on peace operations (Hatto 2013, Daniel 2008, Sihvo 2013). Strategic political coherence, as emphasized by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), underscores the primacy of politics in peace operations, recognizing that sustainable solutions typically require negotiated political agreements (United Nations 2015). In conducting peacekeeping, the UN and its peace operations are now operating in a context where

they collaborate with other international and regional actors, such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), each bringing unique mandates and strengths. This marks a shift towards networked peace operations, requiring the UN to adapt and often take on a convening role among various national and international efforts (Coning and Peter 2019). In this interconnected framework, the UN's approach to peacekeeping involves several key strategies, such as protecting civilians, building the rule of law and security institutions, advancing political solutions to conflict, and promoting human rights. As highlighted by recent discussions, clear, realistic mandates and adequate resources are crucial. Countries like Indonesia and Brazil stress the importance of supporting political processes, while the African and European Union emphasize the necessity of effective partnerships and sufficient funding (United Nations 2024).

Throughout the years, many people have asked why the UN, particularly the Security Council, failed to respond to crises like the ones mentioned above and protect the vulnerable people within that region but not others; Artsakh is one of these cases where the UN *did* opt to intervene - albeit in a minimalist way as an observer mission not infringing on sovereignty. In 2023, the UNSC as well as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have issued various statements as well as code rulings regarding the matter of Artsakh, the 10-month blockade, the military escalations of September 2023 and most importantly the safe return of the refugees that left their home to not be another victim of ethnic cleansing in the region. According to the decision from November of 2023, by a vote of 13 to 2, the Republic of Azerbaijan is mandated to uphold its commitments under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This includes facilitating the safe return of individuals who left Artsakh after September 19, 2023, ensuring the safe departure of those who wish to leave, and

guaranteeing the safety of individuals who choose to stay, free from coercion or intimidation (International Court of Justice 2023). These resolutions have been the result of the constant fight for justice to ensure the equality and safety of the Armenian people living in their historic homeland. Despite these small yet significant victories, many theories were mentioned - some of which talk about the lack of a political agenda whereas others talk about the denial of intervention by the states. Certainly, many professionals and ordinary citizens have been curious as to the answer to this question, however, many of the conclusions and assumptions made by those people were mostly based on personal opinions and - importantly- existing scholarship has not offered a direct answer. The answers are deficient because the cases are not the same. Even when in one scenario the absence of involvement is clear and has a detrimental effect, in others it is more complicated and harder to understand. In various sources, many authors, journalists and other critics agree that coming up with a definite answer is a bit more complicated as to why the UNSC fails to intervene in certain scenarios; new research is needed to re-consider this important question. With this question being a sensitive topic for some, scholars tend to approach this question more carefully yet with a not direct or explicit answer which may help or explain why many people suffer due to injustice yet receive no help from the international community.

Contemporary UN Interventions

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorizes the use of force and engages in peacekeeping based on principles, objectives, and situational demands. Traditional peacekeeping requires the consent of all parties involved in the conflict, ensuring that peacekeepers can operate impartially and maintain the trust of the conflicting sides. Force in these scenarios is limited to self-defense, as outlined by Dag Hammarskjöld, and must be reasonable, necessary, and

proportionate (Lee 2000). In contrast, when dealing with non-state actors, different strategies are needed. In conflicts involving non-state actors with poor human rights records, where comprehensive peace agreements are unattainable, the UNSC may invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter to authorize force beyond self-defense to restore peace and security. This approach is seen in enforcement peacekeeping, where peacekeepers support state-building efforts and extend state authority amid conflict (Peter 2015). The decision to engage in peacekeeping varies based on the nature of the conflict, international consensus, political will, and available resources. Advanced monitoring tools and mission structures are essential to address security threats and gather intelligence, as demonstrated in missions like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and Mali (MINUSMA), which reflect a shift towards more robust mandates (Dorn 2011). Thus, the UNSC's authorization of force and peacekeeping engagements are tailored to the complexities of each conflict and the overarching goal of maintaining international peace and security. The decision to intervene or not reflects the thin line between the imperative of humanitarian intervention and upholding the principles of sovereignty. According to a journal article called "The Responsibility to Protect", it is stated that "what matters is not just state security but the protection of individuals against threats to life, livelihood, or dignity that can come from within or without" which connects to the idea that states have a responsibility to prevent and address mass atrocities whether they are war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide within their borders (Gareth and Sahnoun 2002). When states fail to fulfill that responsibility, the international community may have the duty and expectation to intervene to protect the ones who are vulnerable. However, in cases of atrocities committed in disputed territories, the intervention decision becomes even more complex given that the territory's very own sovereignty is in debate.

The Puzzling Case of Artsakh

Among the disputed territories, the case of Artsakh particularly stands out because there were such key distinctions in the UN 2020 versus 2023, therefore, this study seeks to address and explain the UN intervention that occurred. Armenia, a third-world country with a population of about one million people, has been under constant pressure and ignorance for decades from which its people are under constant attack and oppression from its neighboring country Azerbaijan. The country is the only Christian state which is geographically located between two big Islamic countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan, which have a long-running political dispute regarding this small region. This dispute soon turned into a war which lasted forty-four days killing thousands of people both military and non-military while also being the source of a big humanitarian crisis in the region.

On September 27, 2020, the Azerbaijani side violated the long-enforced ceasefire, starting a war which was the start of many human rights violations. The war began in the undisputed area of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), which is home to more than 120,000 Armenians later resulting in nationwide panic and terror. The name Nagorno Karabakh started to be used after the region came under the Tatar-Mongols around the 1230s as the word Karabakh is a compound word coming from a Turkic word for black (kara) and Persian word for a garden which is bakh (“Brief History of” 2013). As it comes to the word Nagorno, the term emerges from the Soviet term “Nagorniy” which translates as an autonomous region of mountainous Karabakh (BBC 2024). The name Nagorno Karabakh has been popularized both internationally and within the Turkic community, however, within the Armenian nation the name Artsakh is more accepted as it has been used for centuries and has a significance of Armenian heritage and

identity. Recognizing that even the name of the territory itself is disputed, I will be using the latter name throughout my research while recognizing that the dispute over this name is another indicative of how challenging the conflict is. Historically, the land was part of Armenia for centuries from the 4th century BCE to the early 5th century CE, again from the 9th to the 11th centuries, and as part of various Armenian principalities until the 14th century. Later it retained significant Armenian cultural and political connections under Persian and later Russian rule until the early 20th century (Hovannisian 1997) . However, during the years of the Soviet Union that small land was included as an autonomous oblast of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and after it collapsed, it became internationally known as being part of Azerbaijan despite its population of 120,000+ ethnic Armenians and clear display of Armenian heritage (churches, historical monuments, etc) (“Brief history of” 2013).

Despite Artsakh being considered a de facto independent state after 1994, many states around the world still do not recognize it and the overall conflict remains unresolved with the future of the ethnic Armenian population in the region uncertain and precarious (Freedom House n.d.). Being a smaller country with fewer resources and connections, Armenia undertook a major loss and humanitarian catastrophe, leading Armenia to invite and accept to Russian peacekeepers to maintain the peace within that region. However, due to a high death toll of more than six thousand as well as various criminal and humanitarian violations, the international community, particularly the United Nations Security Council has remained inactive during this catastrophe (Droin, Dolbaia, and Abigail Edwards 2023). However, the pressure did not end as just three years later, in 2023, Azerbaijan blocked the main and only road connecting Artsakh to Armenia, cutting essential supplies leaving more than 120,000 people stripped away from necessities like food, medical supplies, gas and even water. For months, both those located in Armenia and the

diaspora have lobbied the international community for additional assistance and even intervention, but they were unsuccessful which soon resulted in a humanitarian crisis resulting in an increased number of people being hospitalized and some even being killed due to lack of supplies.

III. Theoretical Argument:

National Interests:

H1: Differences in national interests among those states that were on the UNSC in 2020 vs. 2023 explain why the UNSC sent observer missions to Artsakh in 2023 vs. 2020 despite the violence spikes being similar.

In this study, I argue - from a structural realist perspective - that the reason why the United Nations Security Council did not intervene in the war of 2020 yet sent two observation missions in 2023 is due to insufficient national interest of the incoming states that were on the UNSC then (relative to those interests of the states on the UNSC in 2020). Starting with the key theoretical argument, looking at the phenomena various theories can explain how the states reacted to the humanitarian crisis that occurred during the two years. As a classical realist, one might argue that the reasoning behind the inaction was due to their lack of interest, and the reasoning behind them was due to the states protecting those self-interests. Moreover, with the protection of those interests, states are also viewed as rational and anarchic due to the absence of an authoritative hierarchy. In addition to this, with states being the primary actors, their behaviour and whether or not there will be intervention is primarily driven by the interests of those states.

The structural realism theory has its perspective on states' political interests and how states act in the international environment. Some of the assumptions that structural realists believe in revolve around the fact that states are the only actors who truly matter in international relations. International relations scholar Morgenthau asserted that realist theory emphasizes the concept of power, asserting that political leaders operate based on interests defined by their pursuit of power (Morgenthau 1954). From this realist perspective, the main and only goal of the policymaker is to increase the national interest of the particular state they represent and understand the factor of no central authority being above the state (Lamy et al. 2022). This ideology of self-interest (i.e., 'self-help') also underscores the principle that states behave following their perceived interests, as proposed by Waltz, who argues that the consistent behavior of states across centuries is attributed to the constraints imposed by the structure of the international system (Waltz 1979). In the tradition of Waltz, structural realists view international cooperation as a difficult and often transient task. In addition to the difficulty of cooperation, realists' main argument about this matter revolves around the importance of power dynamics, hence the balance of power amongst states, as well as the pursuit of national interests, which can sometimes be the result of an ineffective and unsustainable change. I argue that, from this structural realist perspective, observer missions can be a great tool for power projection and influence as well as a way to "search for political settlements through peaceful means" hence serving as a tool for states to legitimize their position on key issues (Citaristi 2022). With states being the main actors as well as having that balance of power, the member states involved in those observer missions can be viewed as a way to have their strategic agendas instrumented as well as protect the strategic interest of the states themselves.

In addition to those strategic interests, the structural realists also believe that not only are the states self-interested but they also act rationally when it comes to protecting those interests. Furthermore, with state identities being given fixed cooperation becomes unlikely and slim which connects back to the example of Russia in the overall conflict of the Artsakh issue both in 2020 and in 2023. After the 44-day war, Russia's intervention in this region became a key factor in monitoring the conflict by sending peacekeepers to the area. With the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE- also known as CSCE) and Russia playing a key role in resolving this conflict, the UN intervention became somewhat complicated. This organization has been present throughout the Cold War and was created as a way of negotiation between the two parts of the world: East and West. The war of 2020 was the ending of the peace that was happening in the region which created worries among the member states within the OSCE. As mentioned before, Artsakh was part of Armenia and during the war of 1992-1994, the UN was handling the conflict by letting the USSR “resolve” it, which complicated the overall conflict.

To provide context, over the last 19 years, there have been multiple attempts at mediation, with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assuming a prominent role. Despite these sustained efforts, there has been a notable absence of substantial progress in resolving the issues under negotiation (Mayer 2013.). This “Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Minsk Group co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and France since 1992, but society and the elite in Armenia, Artsakh, and Azerbaijan remain largely unprepared for compromise” which is why the issue of Artsakh has been overly complicated and hard to resolve (Minasyan 2017). The Artsakh conflict remains unresolved primarily due to entrenched societal and elite reluctance to compromise, compounded by historical grievances and strategic significance. The issue's complexity is exacerbated by the involvement of external actors like

Russia, whose interests often diverge from achieving a peaceful resolution. These factors create formidable obstacles to reaching a lasting agreement within the OSCE Minsk Group framework. Armenia has been part of the OSCE Minsk Group since 2000 and even though the operations were discontinued in the country as of 2017 due to Azerbaijan's veto of extension, the group still worked closely with Armenia to help them maintain the protection of human rights as well as peace and equality. In addition to this group, the partnership and dependency on Russia changed the rules of the game making Russia the one to maintain peace in the region. Due to these beliefs, there was the cause of lack of involvement from the international community because they believed that Russia would solve the issue, which it did in a way but many still question whether or not it was the right decision.

The war ended with Russia reaching an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan to send peacekeepers which included "1,960 personnel with small arms, 90 armoured personnel carriers, and 380 other motor vehicles" and was only for five years unless both sides agreed to extend the period keeping those soldiers there for a longer period (Sargsyan 2021). However, this would not end the conflict whatsoever as clashes between the two groups continued with constant abuse from the Azerbaijani side despite the agreement. Although some may argue that it somehow resolved the issue, I believe that this was just a reason for the UNSC to keep themselves away from the conflict and blame another group, which in this case is Russia, if they failed to complete their mission. Overall this theory remains in question because, despite the Russian peacekeepers, there were still human rights violations occurring, like the blockade of the Lachin corridor which is the only road connecting Armenia to Artsakh in 2023. With the road being blocked by the fake Azerbaijani eco-activists, the 120,000 Armenians in the region are left with no gas, food or medicine and the silence from the United Nations and the inability of Russia

to do something was alarming as well since it resulted in the death of many innocent civilians and eventually led to a massive refugee crisis in the region with forceful displacement of ethnic Armenians. With Russia having such a key role in the conflict, a structural realist argument would be seen as a strategic interest to assert influence in this South Caucasus region.

Furthermore, in 2020, Russia's intervention in brokering the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan also altered the balance of power by putting the country as the key player in resolving this conflict. Overall, Russia's intervention became a strategic calculation for the state to preserve influence as well as safeguard its interests with both countries: Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, with the war in Ukraine, Russia's interests indirectly shifted the interests, especially in its foreign policy approach and its engagement in regional conflicts. By examining Russia's intervention, the structural realist focuses on the ideology of power politics and geopolitical considerations in understanding this intervention in the Artsakh conflict. Whereas there may be other factors at play, I expect to find that changing national interests, but particularly those of Russia as a great power within the international system, shaped the UNSC's shift from hesitance to intervention.

IV. Alternative Explanations (other Hypothesis)

1. Domestic Politics and Economic Ties:

H2: Differences in domestic politics and economic interests among the member states that were on the UNSC in 2020 vs. 2023 explain why the UNSC intervened during the Artsakh conflict in 2023 and not in 2020 despite a similar violence increase.

As one alternative explanation, a competing hypothesis (as seen above) to the reasoning for the intervention of the UNSC in 2023 compared to its inaction back in 2020. The United

Nations Security Council did not get involved in the Artsakh conflict in 2020 but did in 2023 due to changes in the *domestic politics* of the UNSC members across the two time periods. Table 1 shows the Non-Permanent Members during the two different periods.

Table 1: Non-Permanent Members of the UNSC During 2020 and 2023

Non-Permanent Members in 2020	Non-Permanent Members in 2023
1. Belgium	1. Albania
2. Dominican Republic	2. Brazil
3. Estonia	3. Ecuador
4. Germany	4. Gabon
5. Indonesia	5. Ghana
6. Niger	6. Japana
7. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	7. Malta
8. South Africa	8. Mozambique
9. Tunisia	9. Switzerland
10. Vietnam	10. United Arab Emirates

These states may have had various priorities, thereby impacting their decision-making process concerning intervention in the Artsakh conflict. One significant factor in the decision-making could be the changes in the domestic politics and leadership dynamics of the

UNSC member states during these periods, including the influence of political parties and their respective national interests. In 2020, the composition of the Security Council included states with governments representing a range of political ideologies and priorities. These political parties may have had differing national interests and agendas, which could have influenced their governments' positions on intervention in the Artsakh conflict. This suggests that the alignment of national interests with the agendas of political parties in power at the time may have played a role in shaping the UNSC's decision-making process regarding intervention. Starting with the relationship between Europe and Azerbaijan also could have played a factor in not having proper punishment for not only starting the hostilities but also violating and committing many war crimes towards both innocent civilians and prisoners of war.

Europe's strong relationship with Azerbaijan likely led to the lack of strict punishment for Azerbaijan's actions, such as starting hostilities and committing war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war. This affected the countries joining the UN Security Council in 2020 and 2023, including European members like Belgium and Germany, making them more lenient towards Azerbaijan in their decisions. According to Sevinj Mammadova, “Supplying natural gas through pipelines creates a long-term linkage and increases interdependency between suppliers and consumers, which in turn makes the process more vulnerable from the political point of view” (Mammadova 2014).

After the war between Russia and Ukraine and with the sanctions on Russia, Azerbaijan remains the main carrier of this gas to Europe which is why the silence of the UN seems more of a political agenda to have gas carried throughout that region in exchange for inaction and proper punishment for the actions done against the ethnic Armenians. Completing the Southern Gas Corridor has also established a significant link between Azerbaijan's gas reserves and European

markets, creating a long-term interdependency between suppliers and consumers (International Energy Agency 2021). In essence, the economic interests tied to gas exports from Azerbaijan to Europe may have influenced the UNSC's reluctance to intervene decisively in the Artsakh conflict, as maintaining the status quo served the economic and political interests of both European countries and Azerbaijan. This aligns with the notion that national interests, including economic considerations, play a significant role in shaping international responses to conflicts, often at the expense of addressing humanitarian concerns and upholding principles of justice and accountability. Moreover, the diplomatic efforts and strategic interests of UNSC member states further contributed to the role of inaction in the Artsakh (NK) conflict. While economic ties between Europe and Azerbaijan influenced decision-making, strategic considerations also played a pivotal role.

With OCSE and the Russian presence in the region as well as its historical background, Russia has played a significant role in the conflict and throughout the year of 2020, emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution to the conflict through diplomatic means. For instance, Russia, a permanent member of the UNSC, maintains close ties with Armenia and has historically been involved in mediating the NK conflict. Russia's strategic interests in the South Caucasus region, including maintaining influence and stability, may have led to a cautious approach to intervention, as any escalation could risk destabilizing the region and undermining Russian interests. A book named, "Azerbaijan and the European Union", stated that "for the EU, the argument that the key to the conflict resolution lies with Russia" (Van Gils 2020). This statement shows that the EU sees Russia as a key player whose cooperation or intervention is necessary for achieving a lasting solution to the conflict. As a result, the EU may perceive its actions or initiatives as ineffective or futile without Russia's active participation. This perception may lead

the EU to take a passive approach, waiting for Russia to take the lead or make significant contributions to resolving the conflict before committing to any substantial actions or interventions of its own. Following the discussion of the EU's perception of its actions in this conflict, we can draw parallels with the case of the Syrian war to illustrate how the national interests of various UNSC members have shaped the council's involvement. In the Syrian conflict, the UNSC's response has been significantly influenced by the national interests and geopolitical considerations of its permanent members, particularly Russia. The state's strategic interests in Syria, including its military presence and support for the Assad regime, have led to repeated use of veto power to block or weaken resolutions aimed at addressing humanitarian concerns or holding the Syrian government accountable for human rights violations. Similarly, other UNSC members, such as China, have also pursued policies in line with their respective national interests, often leading to divisions and paralysis within the council (Nahlawi 2019). These dynamics highlight how the national interests of UNSC members can impact the council's ability to effectively address conflicts and crises, including its willingness to take decisive action or commit resources to peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts.

Over the years, stressing the importance of self-determination of the people of Artsakh was very important however things do not seem as easy as letting them have the opportunity to choose their fate because Azerbaijan fears that with the majority of the region having people of Armenian descent, the citizens will choose to be more on the side of Armenia rather than Azerbaijan. In the UN General Assembly the idea of sovereignty is also a stressed factor and according to “resolution 46/182 reiterates that "the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of states must be fully respected following the Charter of the United Nations", which makes it difficult to operate in situations where the affected country denies access (Bajoria n.d.).

Since in this case, the affected countries were both Azerbaijan and Armenia, even though Armenia would let international personnel come and report on the scene, the opposite side would not let any access that territory unless they were from countries that Azerbaijan wanted which is why things were more complicated it came to accessing and helping the people affected in that region especially when it is internationally recognized as being part of Azerbaijan. This occurred three years later in 2023 when Azerbaijan initiated an observer mission to the region after more than 120,000 Artsakh citizens were forced to migrate the region which has been under blockade for months and became a target of military violence from the Azerbaijani forces. According to UN News, the mission team traveled from Aghdam, a city in Azerbaijan, to Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh and in the areas they visited saw “no visible damage” to public or religious structures (UN News 2023). This conclusion was negatively viewed by many countries like France and Armenia as they were not necessarily accurate. Even though the mission visited the Lachin corridor and various regions in the capital, the mission was done after the expulsion of its Armenian population, witnessing the abandonment of homes, graves, and cultural heritage.

In October, after the end of the mission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia issued a statement regarding the delegation led by the UN Resident Coordinator in Azerbaijan's visit. In the statement, it was mentioned that following the blockade of the Lachin corridor, Armenia collaborated with the UN to request a fact-finding mission to assess humanitarian and human rights issues and address the needs of Artsakh's people, a concern raised in meetings with the UN Secretary-General. Additionally, experts and scholars specializing in genocide have voicing apprehension regarding the existential crisis confronting the people of Artsakh and concern of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the sole humanitarian organization operating in Artsakh, expressing dismay over its inability to deliver aid to civilians

via the Lachin corridor, underscore the gravity of the situation, which has regrettably been overlooked by the UN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia 2023). Despite this mission being biased and one-sided, it also was a great example of the national interests of the countries involved in the conflict and the reaction received towards the humanitarian crisis that occurred in 2020 and 2023.

Tensions frequently escalate in disputed territories, underscoring the imperative for collaborative global efforts and the intervention of entities such as the United Nations to facilitate diplomatic solutions and prevent violence. One example of these involvements includes the case of Kashmir, a region in India that has been the source of tensions between India and Pakistan dating back to the 1940s. According to the United Nations 42nd edition of Basic Facts, when the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir gained the option to join either India or Pakistan following a partition plan and the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the predominantly Hindu Maharaja of the region, which had a Muslim majority, chose to accede to India by signing the state's instrument of accession. However, tensions arose in 1948 when India complained to the Security Council about various tribesmen with Pakistan's backing and involvement invading the state, escalating tensions into fighting. With Pakistan's denial of the charges, the United Nations sent military observer groups also known as UNMOGIP to the region as a way to supervise the alleged ceasefire between the two countries. Throughout the years, there has been a breach of breakage of ceasefire with both sides engaging in various attacks and killing against one another, however, the UNMOGIP continue their missions "demonstrating that the United Nations has neither forgotten the people of Jammu and Kashmir nor the unresolved conflict in their disputed state" (United Nations Department of Public Information 2017).

Additionally, we have seen UN involvement in some other cases in the South Caucasus with the case of South Ossetia between the countries of Georgia and the Russian Federation. In 2009, with the ending of the UN mandate for the observer mission to Georgia, known as UNOMIG, the mission had been instrumental in maintaining stability in the region and facilitating the return of refugees (Wohlgemuth 2005). Despite ongoing tensions and breaches of ceasefires, initiatives in those regions demonstrate the enduring commitment of the United Nations to address unresolved conflicts and support stability in conflict-affected regions.

Burundi, where ongoing political violence was occurring putting many people in danger and at risk of using their civil rights or personal opinions. Shortly after the election that happened in the country, refusing to accept the new election a civil war broke out putting many people's lives at risk. Some UN experts were concerned about this issue as they believed that the inaction would do more harm than good in the region. Some of those professionals stated, "there is evidence of a functional turn within the UN plenary which includes a greater willingness to confront UNSC inaction, conduct investigations and pass country-specific resolutions on international crimes" which proves the point of why the question regarding the UNSC's inaction during wars and other humanitarian crises should be essential (Ramsden and Hamilton 2017). The issue of Burundi in particular was concerning as no action was taken to prevent the chaos that undertook the country.

Additionally, diving more into a different article by Lee, with an interview which was done between Inner City Press and UN's envoy to the DR Congo Martin Kobler, it was stated that "over 140,000 people have fled into neighbouring countries, including 12,800 to the DRC. I highlight these events to remind us again of the importance of respecting the constitution, and of creating the necessary political space for a national consensus around elections" (Crossette 1996). This highlights that despite having the knowledge and means for constant monitoring, the

UN often refrains from involvement to avoid "disrespecting" regimes that assume control in certain regions, even when those regimes are responsible for deaths and even genocide. Finally, another analogous case of a disputed territory in which one can see the domestic politics at play is the case of Palestine, which similarly to Artsakh (Karabakh), has been an extremely sensitive topic by the international community, in particular at the UNSC. There have been numerous war attempts as well as civilian and military killings involving Israeli and Palestinian combatants and, in the absence of any meaningful peacekeeping force, things worsened resulting in a full-scale war starting in October of 2023. The constant pressure the Israeli government puts on the Palestinians has increased concern from many countries, and the Israel-Hamas conflict has become incredibly contentious and deadly, involving tens of thousands of people killed. As authors, Kamari Maxine Clarke and Sarah-Jane Koulen mentioned Palestine has tried to gain justice from the international government for the atrocities done by the Israeli government however "A key issue, of course, was whether Palestine qualified as a state and could thus accede to the Rome Statute" and with "Palestine's unclear status...this was a matter for the un Secretary General, and by extension the un General Assembly, to resolve" (Clarke and Koulen 2014). In the case of Palestine, relations are complex when it comes to international intervention due to colonial histories and membership status in the UN to begin with which is why intervening is not fit in the opinion of those people, yet they fail to see that being silent does not only keep things unchanged but it also inspires the abusers to use worse tactics to oppress the indigenous people of the region. After discussing these two case studies and talking about why the UNSC does not intervene in those conflicts, the evidence that I will be using which connects more to my research topic is the one of Palestine because similar to that Artsakh is an unrecognized and undisputed territory which is why intervention will not be "proper" and

accepted by the opposite party which in this case is Azerbaijan. As the world continues to grapple with complex geopolitical challenges, the role of international organizations in protecting the vulnerable and promoting peace remains paramount.

The inclusion of new states and the replacement of others in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2023 may have introduced fresh perspectives and priorities, potentially influencing the council's approach to addressing humanitarian concerns and ensuring compliance with international law in conflicts such as the Artsakh issue. As noted by political analysts, the dynamics of international relations often undergo shifts mirroring changes in domestic politics and ideological orientations. This sentiment is encapsulated in the observation made by scholars, reflecting on the historical evolution of democratic politics in Western democracies. According to a book about Geopolitics and Democracy, “For thirty remarkable years—les trente glorieuses—Western democracies’ commitment to the liberal world order deepened” (Trubowitz and Burgoons 2023). Such transformations in democratic politics can profoundly impact international relations, as seen in the potential ramifications for the UNSC's approach to addressing humanitarian concerns and upholding international law in conflicts like the Artsakh issue. For example, countries like Germany, which was also part of the UNSC in 2020, have expressed concern over the military offence by Azerbaijan as well as the blockade in Artsakh. Additionally, Germany has stated that “The men, women and children of Nagorno-Karabakh and the entire region deserve a life without fear ... fear of being forced from their homes or fear of being deprived of their rights, language and religion” (German Federal Foreign Office 2023). Germany's emphasis on the rights and safety of civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh aligns with its broader foreign policy goals of promoting peace, stability, and respect for human dignity. By advocating for a life without fear for the people of the region, Germany underscores the

importance of addressing humanitarian concerns and protecting civilians from violence, displacement, and discrimination. Looking at these individual cases and the overall agenda of the Security Council shows that the fact that the UNSC discussed the humanitarian crisis in Artsakh can be seen as a reflection of domestic policy changes in the countries involved, which influence their foreign policy priorities and engagements on the international stage. This change also shapes their approaches to international conflicts and interventions, including their engagement with the UNSC.

2. Social Constructivist:

H3: Differences in norms especially related to nationalism, multilateralism and humanitarianism among the member states that were on the UNSC in 2020 vs. 2023 explain why the UNSC intervened during the Artsakh conflict in 2023 and not in 2020 despite a similar violence increase.

Another theory that may explain the difference in involvement and non-involvement of the UNSC is through a social constructivist perspective and how it can shape the broader international norms, identities and power dynamics. By focusing on this aspect of state interests, their identities and norms, constructivists explain how those members decide to intervene or abstain from the conflict with the influence of their perception of shared values and the evolving norms of international behavior. These norms are also related to nationalism and multilateralism with multilateral intervention and the role of their ideologies that were present in member states in those years as well as which parties were in power.

Another constructivist explanation also revolves around the ideology of humanitarianism and the responsibility to protect its reasoning, and how it was different in 2020 as opposed to 2023. With this theory, it is believed that the international system itself is not fixed as ideas

fluctuate as norms and values change hence this can be properly drawn from looking at the changes in the rotating state that are not permanent in the Security Council and how with this change the interest of the overall body also can be subject to change. Furthermore, with this change of norms, multilateralism also becomes a norm. From a constructivist perspective, “state interests evolve throughout negotiation and dialogue” (Krause 2002) where states and other actors come to perceive the value and legitimacy of this approach in addressing global changes where shared understanding and identities within the international community are highly emphasized. From looking deeper into the theory, a constructivist would argue that since the norms of the state are not fixed, diplomatic interactions play a key role in constructing understandings of conflicts and framing the possible interaction with them. With the non-permanent states changing, a constructivist can argue that in 2023, the reasoning behind the intervention happened due to more national interests aligning with higher diplomatic interaction and negotiations.

In addition to multilateralism, social constructivists also emphasize humanitarianism and believe in the ideology of responsibility to protect (R2P). Constructivists emphasize that norms are socially constructed and evolve through interactions among states and other actors. With the adaptation of R2P, there is a reflection on this changing consensus regarding the responsibility of states to protect populations from various war crimes against humanity. With this ideology also comes a perception of states within the UNSC in shaping attitudes toward intervention. States’ beliefs about their role in the international system, can be a great influence on the interpretation of R2P and their willingness to support or oppose intervention efforts. This ideology is seen in the lack of intervention in the conflict in 2020 especially with Russia’s influence and considerable weight. Russia’s opposition to external intervention and the escalation of the

conflict with peacekeeping operations in the region likely contributed to the limitation on the application of the R2P principles within the UNSC (Litsas 2023). However, in 2023, with the war on Ukraine becoming a major event, there have been clear tensions between Russia and the Western powers, leading to a broader geopolitical realignment within the UNSC. With countries like Switzerland calling on Azerbaijan to ensure the “unimpeded movement of people” (Security Council 2023). Furthermore, with the 9397th meeting and countries having the chance to speak regarding the concern and the humanitarian crisis happening in the Artsakh region, increased interaction among states eventually shaped the agenda and discourse within the UNSC, promoting particular interpretations of international norms and principles. The complexities of geopolitical dynamics, competing national interests and diplomatic initiatives, shaped the UNSC’s response while highlighting the challenges of applying the responsibility to protect in practice during conflicts where major powers are directly involved or have interests in.

V. Methodology

Discourse Analysis

The methodology of this study serves as a roadmap for how the research was conducted, detailing the methods and techniques utilized to gather and analyze data. This research will follow an observational design with discourse analysis of official UN documents, national policy documents and existing scholarship since I will observe and analyze political phenomena without intervening or manipulating any variables. Since my research will be based on real-world behaviour, this methodology will be the most appropriate for my research (Howard 2017). In addition, to strengthen the validity and reliability of my findings, I will also use various cases and survey questionnaires to limit potential bias. Since the overall research question is about looking through the past and understanding what caused the United Nations to act now versus

earlier in the conflict, I will specifically conduct a) discourse analysis (leaders' statements (quotes), press statements, political party mission statements / mandates, official UN documents, UN security council resolution) and b) even do elite interviews with experts who know about the topic and UN Security Council officials who were directly or indirectly involved in the negotiations as well as those who focus on the involvement of the United Nations and the domestic politics of countries like France, Russia, and even the United States¹. I will interview UN officials remotely via phone or online platforms such as Zoom depending on respondent preference and ask them about their expertise in detail. I will be contacting them and requesting interviews via email. Some of those officials will be UN secretariat officials (i.e. the staff) and delegation officials from specific member states (ex. France, Russia, and the USA) that are currently (since 2023) on the UNSC as opposed to those states that were on the UNSC in 2020 since I am doing a comparison of UN response between those two years. I will analyze the data using qualitative content analysis under my advisor's supervision and using Google Sheets to code the interview response before finalizing and writing the information on the paper. This will be done in conjunction with reading archival and scholarly articles and analyzing existing literature on United Nations missions and involvement in various countries by looking at various cases using the small-N design. The examination will be through document analysis and observation and since two or more cases will be involved, I will use the comparative study method (Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff 2016). Since I had previous knowledge regarding the topic of Artsakh, the overall topic was not foreign to me which is why understanding it was much easier. However, despite the familiarity, I still tried talking to the text drawing conclusions and asking questions on paper which might have led me to answer the research question with a piece of better knowledge.

¹ Research with interviews is awaiting IRB approval and is forthcoming

Limitations

With each new piece of information, I used the 5Ws to help me break down what I had just read to make the connection between the two cases much smoother. One limitation that I encountered was having access to reliable resources because of the topics being discussed. For example in the case of Artsakh, finding existing speeches and UN documentation was harder because some are limited due to the context and historical background of the conflict and or not accessible to the public for various reasons. Since the topic is sensitive and ongoing today both sides are trying to prove their version with pieces of evidence that can be made up. To limit that contradiction I looked at both international (FOX News, CNN, interviews with experts from different countries) and national sources (EVN Report, CBC AZ, the website of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, UN mission of Azerbaijan and Armenia) as well as personal vlogs and even sources of different scholars and professionals to limit the possibility of bias and understand the issue much better. Overall the limitations were not hard to overcome as they gave me a different perspective and approach toward this topic.

VI. Results*Overall Findings*

Following testing of my hypothesis against the alternative one, I realized that the UNSC was a mutual agreement between the states and even though sometimes it is hard to come to a consensus among the states they eventually reach one. Even though Azerbaijan is constantly testing and breaking the ceasefire agreement from 1994 in the region they still allow for the peacekeepers to remain in the territory as a way to show they are willing to contribute with both

Armenia and third parties to come into a negotiation that will be beneficial to both parties and put an end to the long-lasting hate and hostility between the two. After looking through different sources it was evident that “On September 15-16, at France’s request, the UN Security Council dealt with the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict for the first time since 1994” which was two years after the war ended which meant that for two years no action was done to even talk about this issue or bring justice to the crimes done from the Azerbaijani side (Minassian 2022). I found this evidence which proved that my hypothesis was incorrect because I looked into multiple sources and articles as well as different opinions regarding the same issue. By doing so I got access to more articles and interviews even if it meant looking through articles in different languages. Diving more into depth to find an answer opened up different viewpoints regarding the issue and gave a clear understanding and answer to the research question I was trying to answer.

Despite the brief discussion initiated by France in September 2022, the United Nations Security Council's attention to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict remained conspicuously low, especially during the critical period of 2020. This lack of sustained engagement underscores a broader pattern of neglect and deprioritization, wherein pressing humanitarian crises and violations of international law in regions such as Artsakh fail to receive the necessary attention and action from the international community. After an exhaustive review of UN documents, I concluded that the Artsakh conflict has been a low priority especially with Coronavirus still being an important issue worldwide. According to the 2020 report, despite a war happening in 2020 in the region, a statement from the 2020 Annual Report of the UNSC, indicates that the Security Council covered a range of new or rarely discussed issues during its briefings in 2020, including the humanitarian situation in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) (United Nations 2020). The inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh among these topics suggests that it was not a central or regularly

addressed issue on the UNSC's agenda before 2020. This lack of consistent attention from the UNSC to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict throughout 2020 despite various letters and concerns, implies that it was not considered a high priority compared to other global crises and conflicts. Therefore, despite the significant humanitarian impact and ongoing tensions in the region, the UNSC's limited focus on Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that it was not accorded the same level of importance or urgency as other issues on the international agenda during that time.

In 2023, significant shifts occurred in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, marked notably by a blockade and subsequent military escalations in September. These events prompted international attention and action, leading to a series of resolutions and meetings convened by both the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to address the conflict in Artsakh. The blockade, coupled with the escalation of military activities, underscored the urgency of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict and prompted heightened diplomatic efforts on the international stage. The adoption of resolutions and the convening of meetings by the UNSC and ICJ demonstrated a collective recognition of the need for concerted action and dialogue to address the complexities of the conflict and work towards a sustainable peace agreement. Despite these findings, diving more into depth to find an answer opened up different viewpoints regarding the issue and gave a clear understanding and answer to the research question I was trying to answer as well as give me results to my various hypotheses.

Findings based on H1

Based on my research, I found strong support for the first hypothesis. The dynamics within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding its response to conflicts often reflect a complex interplay of national interests, norms, and evolving social constructs among its

member states. This hypothesis posits that differences in national interests among the states comprising the UNSC in 2020 compared to 2023 played a pivotal role in determining the Council's actions during the Artsakh conflict. Specifically, it suggests that despite similar spikes in violence occurring in 2020 and 2023, the UNSC's decision to dispatch observer missions to Artsakh in 2023, as opposed to 2020, can be attributed to shifts in the perceived national interests of key member states. This introductory framework underscores the importance of understanding how changes in the composition of the UNSC and the evolving priorities of its member states shape its responses to conflicts such as the one in Artsakh. Additionally, because realists' assumptions do not change over time, I looked only at the non-permanent members of the UNSC in 2020 and 2023. Moreover, realists argue that in an anarchic international system where there is no overarching authority to enforce rules, powerful states rely on their capabilities, including military strength and economic power, to pursue their interests and ensure their security. Therefore, realists view powerful states as central actors in shaping the dynamics of international relations, with their actions guided primarily by considerations of power and national interest which is why the comparison will be on states that exert significant influence on the global stage. This comparison will focus on the strategies and behaviors of these powerful states in pursuing their national interests, and how their interactions impact the overall stability and structure of the international system. Please refer to Table 1.1 to get a reminder of the Non-Permanent Members of the UN Security Council in 2020 and 2023.

Table 1.1: Non-Permanent Members of the UNSC During 2020 and 2023

Note: Starred states are the ones that have been selected to be analyzed below.

Non-Permanent Members in 2020	Non-Permanent Members in 2023
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11. Belgium ★	2. Albania ★
12. Dominican Republic ★	2. Brazil
13. Estonia	3. Ecuador
14. Germany ★	4. Gabon
15. Indonesia ★	5. Ghana
16. Niger	6. Japana ★
17. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	7. Malta
18. South Africa ★	8. Mozambique
19. Tunisia	9. Switzerland ★
20. Vietnam	10. United Arab Emirates ★

2020 Non-Permanent Members:

Belgium

Belgium, as a member of the European Union, aligns with the EU's stance on the Artsakh conflict. The EU's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, met with Armenia's President Armen Sarkissian to discuss the situation, emphasizing the need for both sides to return to negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. This approach reflects Belgium's commitment to multilateralism and diplomatic solutions to conflicts. Additionally, the EU's continued outreach to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as mentioned by Peter Stano, demonstrates

Belgium's support for diplomatic engagement and dialogue to de-escalate tensions. Belgium's stance is further reinforced by the existence of a special representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, indicating its ongoing involvement and concern for stability in the region. Overall, Belgium's intake on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, as portrayed in this paragraph section, underscores its support for international efforts, particularly through the OSCE Minsk Group, to resolve the conflict peacefully and without preconditions. Furthermore, the Belgian Parliament was active in 2020 in the conflict in terms of resolutions and advocating for international recognition of the humanitarian crisis, calling for an end to hostilities, and urging European partners to take a more active role in mediating the conflict (Asbarez 2020). Belgium's alignment with the EU's approach and emphasis on negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs highlight its preference for multilateral and diplomatic conflict resolution methods, reflecting a broader national interest in maintaining international cooperation and stability. Additionally, Belgium's advocacy for international recognition of the humanitarian crisis and its calls for an end to hostilities underscores its commitment to human rights and humanitarian principles. The active role of the Belgian Parliament in passing resolutions and urging European partners to take a more active role in mediating the conflict demonstrates Belgium's proactive stance in international affairs and its prioritization of active engagement and leadership in addressing international conflicts. Furthermore, Belgium's support for EU foreign policy initiatives and the involvement of a special representative for the South Caucasus highlight its interest in aligning with broader EU strategies and ensuring regional stability. These elements of Belgium's national interest illustrate how, in 2020, Belgium and potentially other nations favored diplomatic and multilateral solutions over direct intervention.

Germany (invited to speak in 2023)

Germany was a non-permanent member in 2020 but not much can be found from this year as it comes to public opinion polls as well as news articles in various newspapers but was invited to speak in 2023 at a UNSC meeting where the Artsakh conflict and the blockade were discussed. Furthermore, despite the lack of opinion polls, in 2023, the chancellor made some statements that show Germany's stance on the overall conflict. According to an article by Politics, During a meeting with Azerbaijan's president, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated Berlin's firm stance on the Karabakh conflict, emphasizing that annexing another country's territory is unacceptable under international law. Scholz highlighted Germany's non-recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent republic, aligning with the UN Charter. President Aliyev of Azerbaijan criticized Armenia for failing to implement UN resolutions and for its occupation of Azerbaijani lands, which led to a prolonged conflict. Aliyev noted that Azerbaijan's military actions in 2020 ended the occupation, restoring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. He also expressed readiness for peace negotiations based on a proposal submitted in 2022 but criticized Armenia for obstructing these efforts. Germany's position underscores its commitment to international law and support for diplomatic resolutions, reflecting a shift towards a more active role in 2023 (Karimli 2023). The article highlights Germany's stance on the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) conflict, illustrating a strong commitment to international law and territorial integrity, as well as a preference for diplomatic solutions. Chancellor Olaf Scholz explicitly condemned the annexation of territories, paralleling Russia's actions in Ukraine with the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby reinforcing Germany's consistent opposition to territorial violations. By clearly stating that Germany does not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent republic, Scholz aligns Germany with international norms and Azerbaijan's territorial claims. Germany's active participation in facilitating peace negotiations, under the

EU's leadership, showcases its proactive role in seeking a peaceful resolution. This engagement underscores Germany's commitment to multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution.

Furthermore, Germany's concerns over regional stability and humanitarian impacts, reflected in its involvement in the diplomatic process, demonstrate a desire to prevent further crises. This stance supports the hypothesis that differences in domestic politics and national interests among UNSC member states influence international interventions, highlighting Germany's shift towards a more active role in 2023 compared to a more cautious approach in 2020.

Dominican Republic (not much to know about their opinion on the topic)

The Dominican Republic's stance on the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) conflict is not prominently documented or widely discussed in international forums. The country's foreign policy typically focuses on regional issues within the Caribbean and Latin America rather than conflicts in distant regions like the South Caucasus. However, the Dominican Republic, as a member of the international community, generally aligns with international norms and principles, particularly those established by the United Nations.

South Africa (not much to know about their opinion on the topic)

South Africa has maintained a neutral stance on the Artsakh conflict, emphasizing the principles of international law and the importance of peaceful negotiations. South Africa, consistent with its foreign policy principles, advocates for the peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue and negotiation, respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations. I tried looking at polls and any other indicator that would show their opinion about the conflict but could not come up with any reliable sources.

Indonesia (not much to know about their opinion on the topic)

Indonesia's stance on the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) conflict has been characterized by its adherence to principles of international law, particularly concerning territorial integrity and sovereignty. Indonesia has traditionally supported Azerbaijan's territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh, aligning with its broader foreign policy emphasis on respecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This position is consistent with Indonesia's own experiences and concerns regarding secessionist movements and territorial disputes within its borders. During periods of heightened conflict, such as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Indonesia has called for an immediate ceasefire and the protection of civilian lives. Indonesia's statements and diplomatic actions typically emphasize the importance of adherence to international law and the United Nations Charter, advocating for peaceful means to resolve disputes and maintain regional stability.

By 2023, shifts in the geopolitical landscape, including changes in the UNSC's composition and evolving national interests, may have led to the deployment of observer missions as a necessary step to address the humanitarian situation and stabilize the region more effectively. This change underscores how varying priorities and strategies among UNSC member states can influence international responses to conflicts.

2023 Non-Permanent Members:

Albania

Albania's strategic significance in regional energy infrastructure and diplomatic relations plays a crucial role in its foreign policy decisions. Albania's position as a key player in energy transport networks, notably the Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (TAP), underscores its importance in regional geopolitics (Huseynov 2022). This significance extends beyond energy infrastructure to diplomatic relations and international influence. Notably, during the escalation of the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Albania's response was influenced by its alignment with states holding differing national interests. In 2020, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Albania's stance on conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh may have been influenced by its partnerships within the UNSC, which could prioritize stability over intervention. However, by 2023, changes in the composition of the UNSC and shifts in Albania's diplomatic priorities, potentially influenced by its energy partnerships and regional alliances, could explain its support for sending observer missions to Artsakh. For instance, Albania's increasing ties with Azerbaijan, evidenced by the establishment of a diplomatic mission and energy cooperation agreements, may have aligned its interests more closely with those of Azerbaijan, influencing its stance on Artsakh and the UNSC's response. In this context, Albania's role in facilitating energy projects like TAP highlights its evolving geopolitical position and the potential influence of energy interests on its foreign policy decisions. This aligns with the hypothesis that differences in national interests among UNSC member states, influenced by factors such as energy partnerships and regional alliances, can explain variations in their responses to conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh over time.

Japan

Japan engages diplomatically with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It maintains bilateral relations with both countries and encourages them to find a peaceful solution to their conflict. Japan's foreign ministry often issues statements calling for ceasefires and the resumption of negotiations during escalations in the conflict. Furthermore, from the press release of the Foreign Ministry of Japan, it was stated that “Japan expresses serious concern over the recent worsening of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and strongly calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for Azerbaijan to stop current military activities” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

2023). Japan's statement expresses serious concern over the recent worsening of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and strongly calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities. By urging Azerbaijan to stop its current military activities and calling on all parties to resolve issues peacefully through dialogue, Japan demonstrates its commitment to peaceful conflict resolution and its opposition to military aggression. This stance reflects Japan's broader foreign policy principles, which emphasize diplomacy, stability, and the rule of law. Japan's call for dialogue underscores its belief in multilateralism and the importance of international cooperation in addressing regional conflicts.

Switzerland

To illustrate the shifting national interests and priorities among UNSC member states between 2020 and 2023, Switzerland's recent actions provide a clear example. In response to the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Switzerland has significantly increased its humanitarian aid to the region. According to a recent statement, "Switzerland is stepping up its support for civilians in Armenia and the region by releasing almost CHF 1.5 million in funding, to be shared among the main humanitarian actors on the ground" (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2023). This action reflects Switzerland's broader national interests in promoting peace, stability, and human rights, aligning with its traditional role as a neutral party and mediator in international conflicts. This increased support also underscores the shifting priorities and interests of the international community between 2020 and 2023. In 2023, countries like Switzerland demonstrated a heightened willingness to actively engage in humanitarian efforts and support international peacekeeping measures, contrasting with a potentially more passive stance in 2020. The proactive engagement from countries with strong humanitarian values likely influenced the UNSC's decision to send observer missions to Artsakh in 2023. This shift

indicates a greater alignment of national interests towards multilateralism and humanitarianism, supporting the hypothesis that changes in these national interests among UNSC member states contributed to the different responses in 2023 versus 2020.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

To illustrate the shifting national interests and priorities among UNSC member states that influenced their responses to the Artsakh conflict, the stance of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) provides a clear example. In contrast to the lack of international intervention in the 2020 Artsakh conflict, the United Arab Emirates' recent actions highlight a shift in national interests towards proactive peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts. His Excellency Ahmed bin Ali Al Sayegh, UAE Minister of State, stated that the recent positive developments, achieved through direct communication, represent a significant step towards a comprehensive peace agreement that promotes development and stability on both regional and international levels. He reaffirmed the UAE's commitment to strengthening peace and stability in the region, emphasizing the importance of building bridges, fostering cooperation, and resolving conflicts through peaceful dialogue (Armenpress 2024). This stance, reflecting a broader international trend towards multilateralism and humanitarian engagement, likely influenced the UNSC's decision to send observer missions to Artsakh in 2023, in stark contrast to the inaction seen in 2020 despite similar levels of violence.

Findings based on H2

Based on my research I found strong support for the second hypothesis. Despite similarities in the severity of the conflict, UNSC intervention differed notably between 2020 and 2023, raising questions about the underlying factors shaping member states' decisions and

priorities. My investigation centers on the hypothesis that differences in domestic politics and economic interests among UNSC member states during these years explain the variance in intervention. By analyzing diplomatic dynamics, economic relations, and geopolitical considerations, we aim to elucidate the intricate interplay of factors influencing UNSC action or inaction during the Artsakh conflict. Through this exploration, we seek to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the complexities surrounding international intervention and conflict resolution within the framework of the UNSC. Since some countries including, France, Russia, and China did not have a change in political change in their countries in the years 2020 and 2023, they were excluded from this section. As it comes to the other non-permanent members, since they were not present at both times (despite Germany who was invited to speak), there can be no comparison made which is why they will also be excluded.

United States of America (USA)

Looking at the United States and comparing the political parties, there has been a significant shift in foreign policy approaches and priorities, which can be observed in their responses to international conflicts. United States' response during the 9422nd meeting was a response to a letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. In their speech, the United States mentioned that "Azerbaijan has a responsibility to ensure that its forces comply rigorously with international law, including international humanitarian law, and the rules governing the conduct of hostilities, the protection of civilians and the humane treatment of combatants" (Security Council 2023). The shift in U.S. foreign policy towards a greater emphasis on human rights and democracy has resulted in increased scrutiny of Azerbaijan's actions in the Artsakh conflict. The change in U.S. politics could also be the reasoning behind diplomatic initiatives and

meetings aimed at addressing the humanitarian situation in Artsakh and finding solutions to protect civilians and ensure their safety.

In 2020 - The Trump administration's approach to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict exemplifies the United States' relative silence and lack of proactive diplomacy during this period. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's non-committal remarks and the absence of immediate, decisive action contrast sharply with the more engaged stance of previous administrations. Under Trump, the U.S. refrained from taking a leading role in international crises, particularly those within Russia's sphere of influence, avoiding statements or actions that could antagonize Vladimir Putin. This hands-off approach is highlighted by the U.S. downgrading its representative to the Minsk Group and issuing tepid responses as violence escalated. In stark contrast, during the previous 2016 conflict, Secretary of State John Kerry's active participation in diplomatic efforts helped mitigate tensions. This passivity in 2020, driven by domestic political considerations and economic interests prioritizing a cautious stance towards Russia, underscores why the U.S. refrained from robust intervention (Safi and Borger 2020). By 2023, shifting dynamics within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), influenced by differing domestic politics and economic interests among member states, prompted a more assertive international response. The UNSC's decision to intervene in the Artsakh conflict in 2023, despite similar violence levels as in 2020, reflects these changing geopolitical priorities and the evolving willingness of key member states to address regional instability more forcefully.

In 2023, however, with the political party changing to a democratic party with President Biden becoming president, we see more direct diplomatic and economic involvement in the conflict. Furthermore, we see condemnation and even a diplomatic visit of Nancy Pelosi to Armenia. According to the speaker, the trip was to show “firm commitment to a peaceful,

prosperous and democratic Armenia, and a stable and secure Caucasus region,” the California Democrat said in a statement Saturday (Agence France- Presse 2022). This active involvement and high-level visit signal the U.S.'s dedication to upholding democratic values and enhancing regional security. By taking a clear stance and engaging directly with affected regions, the Biden administration demonstrated a strategic shift towards more proactive and supportive foreign policy measures. This approach not only reaffirms the U.S.'s role as a global leader in promoting democracy but also strengthens its alliances and reinforces its commitment to global peace and stability.

United Kingdom

In 2020, the United Kingdom's response to the Artsakh conflict was intricately tied to the leadership of Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Under his administration, the country's approach to international affairs was significantly influenced by the prevailing political climate, which was largely dominated by the Conservative Party. This political context shaped the UK's stance on the Artsakh conflict, guiding its diplomatic actions and policy decisions within the framework of both domestic priorities and global geopolitical dynamics (UK Government 2023). Under this administration, the UK's approach was marked by a cautious diplomatic stance, reflecting a delicate balance between upholding international peace initiatives and safeguarding its strategic interests. While the UK advocated for a ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh and stressed the importance of peaceful dialogue, its level of involvement remained relatively limited. This reserved approach mirrored the broader geopolitical context, characterized by ongoing tensions and uncertainty surrounding the conflict. The UK's nuanced diplomatic rhetoric, as evidenced in official statements, underscored a desire to navigate the complexities of the Artsakh conflict without overcommitting to direct intervention.

By 2023, significant changes in the UK's political landscape may have unfolded, potentially including the transition to a new Prime Minister. The possibility of a different ruling party coming into power could have profound implications for the country's approach to international conflicts such as the Artsakh conflict. These shifts in leadership and political dynamics could lead to a reassessment of the UK's diplomatic strategies and engagement levels, as the new administration seeks to assert its foreign policy priorities and navigate emerging global challenges (Institute of Welsh Affairs 2023). The political transition, coupled with evolving domestic priorities and external pressures, could lead to a reassessment of the UK's relationship with the parties involved in the conflict. While the specifics of the UK's stance would depend on the policies and priorities of the new leadership, the shift in political power could potentially impact the UK's level of engagement, its diplomatic efforts, and its willingness to take a more assertive stance on the Artsakh conflict. Notably, discussions within the Welsh political arena have highlighted concerns about the humanitarian crisis in Artsakh, urging for more substantial action from the UK government to address the escalating situation. This underscores the evolving nature of the UK's response to conflicts like Artsakh and the intricacies of domestic politics in shaping international diplomacy and engagement.

Germany

Looking at Germany, I found support for the idea that the change in power domestically seemed to change the priorities and how the state reacted to international conflicts like the Artsakh war. In 2020, Germany's leading party was the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the CDU-CSU. In 2021, an article was written that discussed the ties of Germany and Azerbaijan, especially through the political party of SPD. Looking at Germany, I found support for the idea that the change in power domestically seemed to change the priorities and how the state reacted

to international conflicts like the Artsakh war. In 2020, Germany's leading parties were the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the CDU–CSU. In 2021, an article was written that discussed the ties of Germany and Azerbaijan, especially through the political party of SPD. An op-ed by Robert Hofmann, Boris Kartheuser, and Felix Dachsel argued that Azerbaijan's concerted efforts to influence German politics are indicative of the broader dynamics in international relations, where domestic political and economic interests shape foreign policy decisions. In the context of the UNSC's intervention in the Artsakh conflict, Germany's increased involvement in 2023 can be seen as a response to both internal and external pressures, including the need to balance strategic relationships and maintain regional stability. Furthermore, the article suggests that Azerbaijani lobbying has had some success in shaping German political attitudes, which could influence Germany's stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Hofmann, Kartheuser, and Dachsel 2021). As it comes to the year 2023, continuing to 2024, we have seen increased German engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan amid renewed tensions following a fragile ceasefire in late 2020. In March, Berlin hosted visits from Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In June, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, along with French President Emmanuel Macron, joined peace negotiations led by EU Council President Charles Michel at the European Political Community (EPC) summit in Chisinau. The ongoing crisis around the Lachin Corridor, which connects Armenian-populated areas of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, has heightened fears of renewed conflict in the South Caucasus. Germany's economic and political influence positions it as a crucial player in EU-led diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region. A roundtable organized by the Candid Foundation, APRI Armenia, and Restart Initiative will explore Germany's potential role in achieving lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As it comes to the hypothesis posits that changes in

domestic politics and economic interests among UNSC member states explain why the UNSC intervened in the Artsakh conflict in 2023 but not in 2020, despite similar levels of violence.

As it comes to the year 2023, continuing to 2024, we have seen increased German engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan amid renewed tensions following a fragile ceasefire in late 2020. In March, Berlin hosted visits from Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In June, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, along with French President Emmanuel Macron, joined peace negotiations led by EU Council President Charles Michel at the European Political Community (EPC) summit in Chisinau (Marsh 2024). The ongoing crisis around the Lachin Corridor, which connects Armenian-populated areas of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, has heightened fears of renewed conflict in the South Caucasus. Germany's economic and political influence positions it as a crucial player in EU-led diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region. A roundtable organized by the Candid Foundation, APRI Armenia, and Restart Initiative will explore Germany's potential role in achieving lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This shift highlights how national interests and domestic political changes influence international diplomatic and intervention strategies. The increased German engagement in 2023, compared to a less proactive stance in 2020, can be attributed to evolving domestic political dynamics and the strategic importance of maintaining favorable relations with energy suppliers like Azerbaijan

Findings based on H3

Based on my research I found weak to no support for the second hypothesis. Despite similarities in the escalation of violence between 2020 and 2023, the UNSC's response varied significantly. This section explores the hypothesis that differences in norms, particularly related to nationalism, multilateralism, and humanitarianism among the member states serving on the

UNSC in 2020 compared to 2023, explain the variance in UNSC intervention during the Artsakh conflict. By examining shifts in national interests, perceptions of multilateral cooperation, and commitments to humanitarian principles, this analysis aims to shed light on the complex dynamics influencing UNSC decision-making and the evolving nature of global governance in conflict resolution. Through a nuanced exploration of these factors, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of norms in shaping international responses to conflicts and the efficacy of multilateral institutions like the UNSC in maintaining peace and security on the global stage. According to social constructivists, the power and behavior of big countries are not fixed or predetermined but are subject to change over time due to shifts in ideas, identities, and social dynamics. Changes in national interests may occur due to alterations in the prevailing norms and values within a society or in response to changing international circumstances and interactions. Social constructivists also emphasize the role of diplomatic interactions, international institutions, and collective beliefs in shaping the behavior of big countries and influencing their national interests. The states that were most involved in negotiations include the OSCE group which includes countries of the Russian Federation, the USA, France, and the United Kingdom, the focus will be on these countries to understand their norms in the conflict (OSCE n.d.). By delving into these aspects, this study not only enhances our comprehension of the specific case of the Artsakh conflict but also provides broader insights into how evolving norms and international relations shape the decisions and effectiveness of multilateral organizations like the UNSC. The studies were primarily centered on the United States and Russia due to the noticeable shift in global power dynamics. Russia's increased assertiveness on the international stage contrasted with heightened U.S. involvement, indicating a notable evolution in great power dynamics.

Russia's Responsibility to Protect

The evolving geopolitical landscape and shifts in international relations have significantly influenced the dynamics of the Artsakh conflict and the responses of key global actors. Notably, Russia's traditional approach to its sphere of influence, characterized by strong nationalist and unilateral tendencies, has undergone scrutiny. In 2020, Russia's concept of the 'responsibility to protect' primarily prioritized safeguarding its geopolitical interests over humanitarian concerns, often hindering multilateral interventions. This norm played a pivotal role in the UNSC's inaction during the 2020 Artsakh conflict, where Russia's influence frequently led to a deadlock in multilateral decision-making. According to research by Sam Löfström, data from ACAPS reveals a significant withdrawal of Russian regional influence, primarily due to the Russo-Ukrainian war, as supported by all five data sources. This shift in influence directly motivated Azerbaijan to capitalize on the opportunity to conduct a military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The data indicates that Azerbaijan communicated its intentions to Russia before the conflict, and Russia's decision not to intervene demonstrates a notable change in its regional strategy and influence. This retreat from proactive engagement and the tacit approval of Azerbaijan's actions signify a broader shift in Russia's approach to its historical sphere of influence. The corroboration from multiple sources, including ACAPS, underscores the legitimacy of this shift, highlighting Russia's reallocation of focus and resources from the South Caucasus to the more pressing conflict in Ukraine (Löfström 2023). This reorientation reflects a fundamental change in Russia's foreign policy priorities and its impact on regional dynamics. Furthermore, this shift in Russia's stance can be seen as part of a broader change in norms among UNSC member states from 2020 to 2023. In 2020, Russia's traditional approach to its sphere of influence was characterized by strong nationalist and unilateral tendencies, which often hindered

multilateral interventions. The Russian concept of the 'responsibility to protect' was primarily focused on protecting its geopolitical interests rather than humanitarian concerns. This norm was a significant factor in the UNSC's inaction during the 2020 Artsakh conflict, as Russia's influence often led to a deadlock in multilateral decision-making.

By 2023, however, the landscape had changed. Russia's preoccupation with the conflict in Ukraine diminished its unilateral control over regional dynamics in the South Caucasus, allowing for a more multilateral approach to conflicts like the one in Nagorno-Karabakh. This shift, combined with increased humanitarian concerns and the willingness of other UNSC members to act on these concerns, facilitated the intervention in 2023. The UNSC's decision to send observer missions to Artsakh reflects a growing emphasis on multilateralism and humanitarianism, norms that gained prominence among member states due to Russia's reduced ability to impose its nationalist agenda. The changes in Russia's foreign policy and the broader international response to humanitarian crises illustrate why the UNSC was able to intervene in the Artsakh conflict in 2023, despite a similar level of violence as in 2020. This evolution highlights how shifts in the balance of national interests and the adoption of new norms related to multilateralism and humanitarianism among UNSC member states can influence the Council's actions.

USA's humanitarian protection

The differences in norms related to nationalism, multilateralism, and humanitarianism among the UNSC member states in 2020 vs. 2023 explain why the UNSC intervened during the Artsakh conflict in 2023 but not in 2020 despite similar levels of violence. By 2023, the U.S. had shifted towards a more engaged foreign policy that emphasized humanitarian protection norms, contrasting with the Trump administration's more isolationist stance in 2020. This change likely influenced the UNSC's willingness to act. According to “the last few years have seen changed

strategies from Armenia, where the state has been more open to diplomacy and compromise, as well as supporting missions from the European Union” (Löfström 2023). Additionally, Armenia's new strategies of being more open to diplomacy and compromise, supported by the European Union, created a more favorable environment for international mediation. This shift towards multilateralism was a stark departure from the more nationalistic approaches of the past, making a UNSC intervention more viable. The increased involvement and support from the EU also underscored the broader international consensus on the need for collective action, highlighting why the UNSC took action in 2023. These changes in the international norms and strategies of key players demonstrate why the UNSC intervened in 2023 despite similar violence levels to those in 2020.

VII. Conclusion

In considering competing explanations for decision-making within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding its response to the Artsakh conflict, my research has uncovered compelling evidence supporting the hypotheses put forth. Hypotheses 1 and 2, which postulated that differences in national interests and domestic politics among UNSC member states explain the variance in intervention, were substantiated by the detailed analysis of diplomatic actions and shifts in political landscapes and I found strong evidence for what meaning both of the factors had their role in the way states reacted to the conflict. We observed clear correlations between changes in domestic political power, economic interests, and the level of international engagement, demonstrating how these factors shape states' responses to conflicts. Conversely, Hypothesis 3, which focused on differences in norms among UNSC member states, while supported to some extent, lacked robust data and conclusive evidence, indicating the need for further research in this area. This research carries profound implications for understanding

international relations and conflict resolution mechanisms. By elucidating the intricate interplay of national interests, domestic politics, and evolving norms, we gain valuable insights into the complexities of global governance and the decision-making processes of multilateral institutions like the UNSC. These insights are not only pertinent to comprehending past conflicts but also hold relevance for future diplomatic endeavors. Armed with a deeper understanding of the factors influencing state behavior, policymakers and international organizations can devise more effective strategies for conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution. Moreover, by highlighting the importance of multilateralism, humanitarianism, and diplomacy in shaping international responses to crises, this research underscores the significance of fostering cooperation and dialogue on the global stage.

Moving forward, the implications of my research extend beyond the immediate context of the Artsakh conflict, resonating deeply within the broader landscape of international relations and diplomacy. By shedding light on the intricate interplay of national interests, domestic politics, and evolving norms, these findings underscore the complexity of global governance and the decision-making processes of multilateral institutions like the UNSC. This deeper understanding not only enriches our comprehension of past conflicts but also serves as a guiding beacon for future diplomatic endeavors. As the world grapples with an array of complex challenges, from regional conflicts to global pandemics, the importance of fostering cooperation and dialogue on the global stage cannot be overstated. This research highlights the pivotal role of multilateralism, humanitarianism, and diplomacy in shaping international responses to crises, offering a roadmap for policymakers and international organizations seeking to navigate the turbulent waters of global politics. By embracing these principles and striving for consensus-driven solutions, the international community can forge a path toward a more

peaceful, stable, and equitable world. In doing so, we honor the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and reaffirm our collective commitment to building a brighter future for generations to come.

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